Marples and Beeching

My copies are buried in the loft; I think the article was by Geoffrey Skelsey (who has written a number of closure related articles over the years).


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I suppose there are two possible things which could happen.

One is sheer corruption, or graft --- preferring the Marples Ridgway bid to the Costain one, for example. In looking at the various websites, I came across a question to Mrs Thatcher asking her to list the road contracts awarded while Marples was Minister, which she did, noting that they were all awarded by competitive tender. None of the websites I've come across which are highly critical of Marples assert anything like Poulson in the case of Marples Ridgway. That would, of course, have been a huge story. It's difficult to prove a negative but as regards corruption in public office, no-one seems to have produced any evidence.

Then there is influence --- deliberately creating or fostering an environment in which your firm is likely to prosper. I think there were issues about whether Marples should have been appointed in the first place, and clearly there were issues surrounding his financial interest in Marples Ridgway while he was Minister. That is sleazy. Did that influence the direction of policy? Who can say, but one point worth noting is that five years as Minister was too short a time for schemes to have gone from planning to construction. Either schemes like the Hammersmith Flyover which MR built will have been planned long before 1959 or schemes such as the M56 will have been delivered long after Marples was Minister. So finding the smoking gun is inherently tricky.

Worth noting perhaps that a lot of Marples Ridgway work was power stations, dams, and a lot was overseas. They were not predominantly a UK roadbuilder.

 

That is certainly true. The Hull & Barnsley gradually declined over several decades, starting with loss of traffic during WW1 and the withdrawal in 1917 of the through H&B "express" trains from Hull to Sheffield Midland.

The H&B was always a predominantly freight railway with only limited passenger services. Bradshaw for 1922 shows a weekday service of only two trains traversing the full length of the H&B main-line from Hull to Cudworth (53 miles), stopping at all stations. Three more trains ran from Hull to South Howden (24 miles) and a further four from Hull to North Cave (15 miles).

Another relatively early closure was the M&SWJ, which lost its passenger service in Sep 1961, just 3 months after Dr Beeching had taken over as head of the BTC.

 

I suspect from what you have said, we have a Minister with a 'colourful history' an interest in a major Civil Engineering Contractor AND who became Minister for Transport so clearly it is easy to put two and two together and make four, but as you say the reality doesnt necessarily agree with the allegations against him.

What I think is clear however was in that era there was a clear pro road anti rail direction in policy which wasnt just Marples doing

 

TBH in that era the thinking was that the railways had about as much to offer long term transport policy as the canals did.

 

Indeed. And that was not just politicians or civil servants, but a widespread belief that the future lay with the car.


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I think there are two other issues - how effective BR management in the 1948-1960 period in lobbying ministers for funding/investment vs the effectiveness of the roads/haulage lobby in the same period. It is notable that people praise later BR chairmen such as Peter Parker because of their effectiveness in arguing the case for the railways but that case is essentially a defensive case - safeguarding the railways from further cuts, rather than expansion. Beeching was clearly of the view that the govt was right and he was there to enact that.

The other point (to come back to @Fred Kerr's argument) - while you can argue that the modernisation schemes were not a failure, the narrative emerged of a profligate railway did emerge and became embedded and was a stick to beat the railways with and to justify cuts. (Much like narratives about other sections of public services). The question is how much did railway senior management do to counter-act this narrative or was it only realised until too late.

It would be interesting to investigate - and I am sure the files much be there in the PRO about BR-MOT relations in the period.

 

Does this one work for you?
https://national-preservation.com/threads/privatisation-the-railway-revolution.248286/#post-814169

 

IIRC the narrative that emerged was of a railway continually needing subsidies to cover the annual losses; those losses being the interest paid on the monies provided for the Modernisation Plan and which converted annual operating profit into a net loss once interest payments and other expenditures were deducted. History shows that the railways in the early days of nationalisation were treated as a milch cow to fund other projects; one example being that British Rail had to publish their carriage rates whilst the road haulage industry, which used those published rates to undercut the railways, didn't have to.

 

With respect, that wasn’t the railway being used as a milch cow but being hamstrung by anti monopoly rules designed for the late Victorian era that weren’t applicable to its competitors, and were wholly irrelevant to the conditions of the 1950s.


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Didn't really quite fly that one! I think seven years on, with the Williams Report, the events surrounding the TOCs and the end of the franchise model, the life after Covid dimension and GBR we should start again if there is an appetite. Or we could leave it to our friends on another site!

 

Overall, on analysis, it seems to be the case that although there is strong evidence to suggest graft and corruption by Marples, it may be circumstantial.

He WAS very bent, that is not disputed, he was minister of transport at a time when a very dubious policy, benefiting the road lobby was being pushed, again not in dispute. He was part owner of a construction firm who could gain road building contracts, again not disputed.

The question is, did he actually gain from the closures personally? Don't know.

Also, there was a perception at the time that the railways were a bit of a money pit, after all, they wasted a shed load on the modernisation plan, which didn't work

 

We all have our views on the Beeching era, but just in case you haven't read it, Richard Hardy's book Beeching Champion of the Railway? can be had second hand from around £3 to £6 at the obvious website. I guarantee that, whatever your perspective, there is thought provoking stuff on every page and the pleasure of Hardy's inimitable style.

 

Peter
I purchased and have read it after you recommended it previously and agree.
Paul

 

It seems to me that Nationalisation itself was a disadvantage to the railways from the point of view that it converted the owners of the railways from being shareholders to being bond holders. The railways' share capital was complicated, but in essence the shareholders were paid out of profits, and if there were no profits there were no payments. Upon nationalisation their shares were exchanged for interest bearing bonds, with the interest paid regardless of the level of profit. BR had to pay this interest, and most years these payments wiped out any operating profit. I have wondered if those who drafted the nationalisation scheme realised that would occur, and it was deliberate to further disadvantage the railways compared to road transport.
The railways were seriously disadvantaged against road transport, and has already been said, were seen as being in managed decline, eventually to be largely replaced by road transport. Marples actions can be seen in that light.
As we see today, public services such as railways meant public cost ie tax, while private business, in this case roads, meant private profit. That interested MPs then as now.

 

My late father was apalled by railway privatisation.

After being demobbed in 1946 he returned to The Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Company and had to convert lots of often very small holdings of railway stock, and there were many different issues into BTC Stock.

He wasnt pleased at all that work beng wasted.

 

Whatever other motives were afoot, I very much doubt that the intent was to disadvantage the railway relative to other modes. The assumption underlying nationalisation was that the railways would pay their way, and sustained structural losses came as a nasty surprise in the 1950s.

 

It seems that the Atlee Government had no idea what they were buying thinking that the railways were a profitable undertaking.

They might have done better waitng a year or two and buying the 'Big Four' from The Liquidator

 

Not convinced it would have gone that way - Gourvish is very clear about the issues caused by the BTC structure, and the unclear objectives that went with it.