WCRC Licence Suspended

No it doesn't. The words above do not say "data recorder was not working".

 

I agree and think people are reading things into the WCRC statement which are not there, the suggestion by someone they were attempting to circumvent the ban is utterly ridiculous, if you are hiring out to another TOC, then it runs under their safety case, which is entirely above board in NR's eyes, and means some tours can run at least.

 

Well for a start... regret,sorry? Trains have already been cancelled. For multiple reasons debated above,we know DBS can't pick up the vast majority of steam workings, so why pretend that they can?

 

Tornado of course, WCRC's favourite loco. There's also Clan Line, if they feel like some extra funds at the last minute pre-overhaul. 60007 too...

 

3. Implement arrangements to accurately record, monitor and manage all train protection

activations (including Automatic Warning System and Train Protection and Warning System),

Says it wasn't

 

Firstly Mods if you want to split the thread feel free to move this, I do appreciate that thread management is a chore so not sure whether to start one or not

From the RAIB initial report...

The RAIB has found no evidence of any malfunction of the signalling, AWS or TPWS equipment involved in the incident.

Suggests it was!

 

I give up. Think what you like. It doesn't matter what spleen is vented on railway enthusiast forums. Unless anyone commits libel!

 

That is a fair comment. Although, Freedom of Information rules allow 30 days for a response and information would only become public if a journalist/member of public requested it. The language in the letter also suggests to me that the decision to publish upfront was probably a concious one.

 

Hang on a minute,we were specifically requested by the Moderators here :

http://www.national-preservation.co...-march-wootton-bassett-incident.444267/page-3

NOT to discuss this incident. Presumably this is still the case?

 

I think events have overtaken that somewhat............

Now all we can do is wait until mid May to find out the result of how good WCRC response to NR's demands are........... in the meantime, there's going to be quite a few spare paths on the network it seems.....

 

Firstly Mods if you want to split the thread feel free to move this, I do appreciate that multiple thread management is a chore so not sure whether to start one or not..

The below is lifted from the RAIB website verbatim...

The RAIB’s preliminary examination has shown that, at around 17:24 hrs, train 1Z67 was approaching signal SN43 at 59 mph, when it passed over the temporary AWS magnet associated with the TSR. This created both an audible and visual warning in the locomotive’s cab. However, as the driver did not acknowledge this warning within 2.7 seconds, the AWS system on the locomotive automatically applied the train’s brakes. This brake application should have resulted in the train being brought to a stand. In these circumstances, the railway rule book requires that the driver immediately contact the signaller.

The RAIB has found evidence that the driver of 1Z67 did not bring the train to a stand and contact the signaller after experiencing this brake application. Evidence shows that the driver and fireman instead took an action which cancelled the effect of the AWS braking demand after a short period and a reduction in train speed of only around 8 mph. The action taken also had the effect of making subsequent AWS or TPWS brake demands ineffective.

Shortly after passing the AWS magnet for the TSR, the train passed signal SN43, which was at caution. Although the AWS warning associated with this signal was acknowledged by the driver, the speed of the train was not then reduced appropriately on the approach to the next signal, SN45, which was at danger. Because of the earlier actions of the driver and fireman, the TPWS equipment associated with signal SN45 was unable to control the speed of the train on approach to this signal.

As train 1Z67 approached signal SN45, the driver saw that it was at danger and fully applied the train’s brakes. However, by this point there was insufficient distance remaining to bring the train to a stand before it reached the junction beyond SN45. The train subsequently stopped, standing on both the crossovers and the up and down Badminton lines, at around 17:26 hrs. The signalling system had already set the points at the junction in anticipation of the later movement of 1Z67 across it; this meant that no damage was sustained to either the train or the infrastructure as a result of the SPAD.

Whilst the suspension of WCRC seems to he the headline news on NP, the above is the RAIB's own initial report, I know there are a number of signalling and general operations specialists on here and I would be interested to hear an interpretation (WNXX seems to be quite measured in its response and analysis of this). They key element (to my limited knowledge) seems to be 'Evidence shows that the driver and fireman instead took an action which cancelled the effect of the AWS braking demand after a short period and a reduction in train speed of only around 8 mph. The action taken also had the effect of making subsequent AWS or TPWS brake demands ineffective.' what action was or could be taken and why ?

Equally Mods if this is taking things in a direction that you would rather not have the hassle of dealing with feel free to delete this!

 

Sorry Mods - didn't see the note from last week (Friday) asking to not discuss until after posted this - apologies feel free to get rid!

 

Says the AWS and the TPWS was working. Says nothing about the OTMR.

 

Exactly and sadly I suspect a fairly large number of staff at WCRC who work on this charter traffic and thus will be dependent about the future outcome.

 

Are Ian's 5s air braked?

 

Going to be a problem, the two are interlinked, and will continue to crop up. I guess you can either ban both subjects or none at all.

 

I would assume that the fact that they state as fact that 'Evidence shows that the driver and fireman instead took an action which cancelled the effect of the AWS braking demand after a short period and a reduction in train speed of only around 8 mph. The action taken also had the effect of making subsequent AWS or TPWS brake demands ineffective.' is sufficiently accurate and stated as a fact to suggest they are getting the detail from somewhere which would suggest OTMR was working.

But to be fair we now little of the facts and thus should assume nothing.

 

Tell you what, you tell me what you think

Implement arrangements to accurately record, monitor and manage all train protection

activations (including Automatic Warning System and Train Protection and Warning System),

means, and why it was pointed out as an issue

 

Frankly I don't see why we should not discuss what is in the public domain. The action taken was to isolate the TPWS/AWS system and continue running, that is what that RAIB statement means. AFAIK that is not what the rule book requires, which might explain in part the action NR have taken. I believe that if it is necessary to isolate the TPWS system you must bring the train to a stand and contact the signaller first. As to why it was isolated and why the signaller was not contacted, that is for the RAIB to establish, and I'll refrain from speculating.