Edward Thompson: Wartime C.M.E. Discussion

Over the past few days of viewing this thread, I have an overpowering feeling of deja vu. I can't help wonder why young Mr. Martin felt the need to resurrect it recently when we're only going over old ground yet again.

 

You'll forgive me I hope but it was a way of examining a strange email from a friend. I agree, we've retreaded old ground but some new points have been made too. I was fascinated by Julian's post on the GWR on the previous page for example.

 

Durrant was a major steam enthusiast who spent all his holidays as a schoolboy, apprentice and drawing office junior trekking round Britain and Europe watching locomotives. I doubt it was one year, but late 40s, early 50s. He comments frequently about classes with uneven exhaust beats, no doubt his trained ear could detect much that mine could not.
He talks about Gresley classes as being mechanically unimpressive, Thompson Pacifics as having good concepts but poor execution, and the Peppercorns as being the best express locomotives in Britain.

 

That's given me a good laugh.

 

Thanks for the info - at that time all but 5 of the Gresley Pacifics and V2s had single blastpipes as against the double kylchap of the A1s. That alone would lead to the harsher exhaust and copious smoke. As to the beat - the problem was on cylinder doing too much work, not enough, but it 's quite likely that the gear was even then not being maintained as well as it was later in the 50s. I wonder who was CME when he was in the Drawing office.

 

Sorry to double post - I'm being quoted above, and so is the report by Stanier/Cox, so rather than go through the whole lot again, the original post of the report by Mr Martin was post 644. My replies in the following discussion are basically contained in posts 712, 716, 748, 788, 836 and 846. Perhaps everyone should go back and refresh their memories of all the posts made then, rather than rehash the whole argument again.

 

Yes that seems sensible.

 

The full whitemetal and felt pad lubrication plus close tolerance machining were worked out on the GWR in the early 30s. Apparently they got the idea of using felt pads from machine tool design. It wasn't one single change but a series of incremental developments. According to Cook a couple of years after the Kings were introduced they started to see signs of heating on the big ends during routine inspections, so worked on the problem although they had no serious failures. Cook says that although he did have some rods with Swindon style big ends (which did have some French DNA in their ancestry) made up for the LNER Pacifics there was no advantage to them over the Gresley marine style of big end once the other changes had been made.

 

Thanks for the info. I've remembered a reference by B Spencer in the Steam index website to German rod end design.

I had been much impressed by the excellent design of rod ends that I had seen on German locomotives. These were of T-section with a deep crescent-shaped rib or web at the back in order to resist deflection. This was the design that we recommended and which was ultimately adopted as the standard - not quite as we wanted, as the rib was made concentric instead of crescentshaped, but still a good deal stiffer than the original design. This improved pattern may be seen on nearly all the Gresley three-cylinder locomotives that have been preserved.

Having seen a drawing of the revised rod end, it looks like the one on Tornado, and that is massive!

 

This is a bit of an aside, but Simon can I please suggest you read the Klaus Marx book on Douglas Earle Marsh in the same Oakwood series as Peter Grafton on Thompson. Klaus unearthered significant documents how Marsh dealt with labour disputes at Brighton Works. Tom will no doubt be familiar with this as well.

All primary source material not previously commented on or researched previously.

Although Thompson went into print very rarely, and did not take part in the Inst LE, Gresley, Clayton, and Holcroft did, and provided primary source material on the conjugated gear. I have referenced other Holcroft sources such as his 1946 articles in The Engineer, and his reply to Clifford Cocks in the Inst LE 1948 in my post on page 41 here on Feb 27th 2015, post 819.

I also quoted primary source stuff in my post of Feb 20th 2015, post 776 which you did not reply to.

I am quite sure E.S. Cox did not have a good grasp of the conjugated gear when asked to write the report in 1942. E.S. Cox was not a valve gear expert, as very few were in the 20thC. I have an unusual link to Stuart Cox.

Holcroft commented in 1946 how to deal with the middle valve overunning by altering the levers. I am quite sure this public comment was made as a result of the ongoing alteration to Great Northern at the time.

It is a recognised fact that one of the conjugated gear SECR locos when on indicator trials showed perfect diagrams. E.S. Cox ignored this evidence, as he ignored the performance of the conjugated LNER locos pre WW2.

It is only by looking at Thompson's approach in a wider context that I suggest a proper analysis can be arrived at. It also condemns the Stanier/Cox report.

These are tricky design issues. They cannot be swept aside stating 'It was wartime, we didnt have enough fitters to grease the conjugated gear pins every 2 weeks'. Lplus has already many posts ago quoted Bill Harvey's simple remedy to the problem of not getting smokebox ash onto the conjugated gear pins. One has to ask why Thompson didnt see what Bill Harvey saw?

Was it that Thompson, immaculately dressed with his public school and Oxbridge education and gold pens, was aloof to the fundamentals?

Something similar happened on the GWR with Churchward and Collett. They were inside a firebox and Collett asked the boiler fitter for an 'illuminant'. The fitter had no idea what an 'illuminant' was, so Churchward shouted 'give us the bl--dy flame'!

Cheers,
Julian

Edit - Bill Harvey , not Dick Hardy as originally typed

 

jma109 noted :

These are tricky design issues. They cannot be swept aside stating 'It was wartime, we didnt have enough fitters to grease the conjugated gear pins every 2 weeks'. Lplus has already many posts ago quoted Dick Hardy's simple remedy to the problem of not getting smokebox ash onto the conjugated gear pins. One has to ask why Thompson didnt see what Dick Hardy saw?

Reference to Haymarket's policy of maintenance was noted by Harry Knox in his book [Haymarket Motive Power Depot Edinburgh] where at Chapter 28 Page 178 he notes that this "threat" to the conjugated valve gear was apparent to fitters at Haymarket depot where the maintenance regime included the addition to the "Number 6 Exam" (removal of valves and pistons every 30 / 36000 miles) of dismantling the conjugated valve gear and renewing pins and bearings as required.

If Thompson was doing his job properly he should have been monitoring the MPC figures for his main locomotives and therefore noted the higher mileage figures obtained by Haymarket; that should have led to an investigation asto why the difference. I venture to suggest that Thompson was not a good delegator hence had so much involvement in major decisions that the "minor" matter of comparing depot MPC figures were not given a second thought. A pity methinks as this seems a good case of the ship being spoiled for a ha'pence of tar !

Note to Simon : I would recommend read of Harry Knox's book as it includes an analysis of the depot's locomotives throughout its time of maintaining steam locomotives from the standpoint of a member of the depot staff; worth a look methinks.

 

Thompson was clearly not perfect, none of us are.
However, there does seem to be a different standard applied to assessing him compared to other loco engineers.
As has been stated here, many I the greatest CMEs didn't fully understand superheating, valve events, steam dynamics... All CMEs including the greatest has their geese as well as their swans.
How is it that ET is always "aloof" and "arrogant", while our beloved Churchward or Gresley (and yes, I think they were great men) are fondly called "martinets" for the same sort of behaviour?
Thompson apparently did do the right things when it came to the valve gear - he tested, he consulted those who maintained the locos, he brought in an outside consultant who made a clear recommendation, he acted on that. Yes - he introduced new issues to the pacifics (but the other conversations were fine). Peppercorn corrected these new issues, but did not revert to Gresley valve gear, which is very eloquent. In other words, in the 1940s there was consensus (including LMS and SR loco engineers) that the conjugated valve gear should be discontinued and even removed. Yes, but the late 1950s another, better, solution (as in cost benefit) had been found. But without a Tardis this could not have been applied in 1942 (even had the materials been available).
So, all in all, ET was a perfectly adequate CME in terms of express locos (enthusiasts obsession) and a very good one for mixed traffic and freight (actually much more important to both the LNER and the country at the time) - areas in which Gresley was not as superlative as he was in the top link.
No one is arguing Thompson was as great a CME as Gresley (or Stanier or Churchward or even Collett or Maunsell) but, like Fowler, he deserves respect for what he achieved and not just condemnation for the undiplomatic choice of subjects for conversion (foolish though that was).

 

Not sure Martinet is the right word - strong willed and prepared to speak their minds perhaps. I get the feeling Gresley would could lose his temper easily but then rapidly return to normal - and it seems they could both be "comfortable" talking to anyone from the Chairman of the Board to the lowliest cleaner. Thompson seems to have held grudges and been unable to relate to those further down the pay scale shall we say. Since they are often the ones who's memories form the historical background, I'm not surprised Thompson is seen as aloof.

As to respect, I don't think anyone has argued that his B1 was not a good loco and his modified O4's were effective locos. Even the L1 wasn't a failure, just not as good as it might have been

 

Have you seen the story in "Master Builders of Steam"

But its quite true: some people seem to have the gift which others don't for no obvious reason. I remember saying to a former manager "one of the most powerful tools you have is an ability to do management by fear and still have people like you". People seem to be quite happy with treatment from management they like and respect that from others would result in outright rebellion.

 

It is frustrating to read that as it is an extraordinary generalisation: particularly when there is evidence to show Thompson was quite the opposite! Particularly with regards the apprenticeships that he pushed for whilst at Stratford and as CME for young engineers.

Dick Hardy has written much on Edward Thompson - from his book Steam in the Blood (pages 56-59):

There is a lot to type after that, so I won't bore you with the full details, but the descriptions of the events which followed (being given engine passes, perhaps missing out on the RAF, his encouragement in the career, sending him to Leslie Parker, and many more) tell a very different story. Many of Thompson's loudest critics are from his engineering peers (ES Cox, Freddie Harrison) or from the time keepers (OS Nock, Cecil J. Allen) and they hardly fit your description.

Whereas Dick Hardy fits the description of the lower pay scale well and a completely different story emerges.

It should be pointed out that Dick Hardy was actually working in the drawing office when 4470 was re-designed and his views on 4470 are in complete contrast to the populist views on that locomotive.

That seems a fair appraisal and I would agree. However more heat than light has been generated regarding his Pacifics and the one off prototypes regularly get dismissed out of hand when there are first hand accounts of them being somewhat better than their reputation gives.

 

Ok, dropping the PC approach - I would say Thompson couldn't relate to those whose temperament or intelligence didn't suit them to a senior managerial position. I have read Steam in the Blood and Dick Hardy was intended for and achieved a senior managerial position.

Maybe you could call it a character flaw....

 

My apologies: I will revert back to you Julian when I have read it. Sometimes I miss things; threads on Nat Pres can move quite quickly. Nevertheless I will go and read it accordingly.

I am quite sure E.S. Cox did not have a good grasp of the conjugated gear when asked to write the report in 1942. E.S. Cox was not a valve gear expert, as very few were in the 20thC. I have an unusual link to Stuart Cox.

But that would have been no good to Thompson who retired in 1946, leaving it to Peppercorn who continued Thompson's brief and kept the conjugated valve gear locomotives as the "non-standard group to be retained" and continuing to build all new locomotives with either two cylinders for small and medium locomotives and three sets of walschaerts for the Pacifics.

But the issue in 1942 was not the performance of the valve gear pre WW2. It was the performance of the valve gear at the time. That was the main issue. Pre war standards of maintenance were much, much higher and the gear could be maintained well because there was the manpower, money and materials to maintain it.

In 1942 Britain was in the middle of the second world war and nobody could be expected to know how long it would go on for or if it would ever be possible to return to pre-war standards of maintenance.

So arguably, Cox was perfectly within his remit to look at the situation as it stood and to report back on that. It is very easy - as I have said a number of times - to look at the whole history of conjugated valve gear and say "it was fine pre-war and post-war therefore it works fine" but that's not the issue. The issue is that it wasn't working at the time during the war and the situation was getting worse, not better.

I think that is the problem: context. You say the report condemns the Cox report. The Cox report is a snapshot in time of what the LNER was experiencing.

They were not soothsayers so could not possibly know what the conditions of maintenance were to be like post war with the conjugated valve gear. There were clearly problems at the time and Cox looked at the evidence available and made a report on what was happening at the time.

They weren't building for the past conditions: they were looking at the present working conditions and an unknown future.

If they are tricky design issues then the solution to remove these problems altogether seems a simple enough solution: and you must admit that this solution when carried out on new build small and medium sized locomotives proved that Thompson abundantly right to make this choice.

Every other railway company in Britain - every other railway company in Europe, in the Americas, in Australia and in New Zealand, used two cylinders for small and medium sized locomotives.

Thompson changes this on the LNER for new build locomotives going forward from Gresley and he is outright condemned despite all evidence to the contrary.

It seems to be such an assumption that someone who goes to public school and Oxbridge must also be aloof yet when presented with evidence to the contrary (as above from Dick Hardy) the impression remains steadfast.

This is exactly what I am talking about when I say Thompson gets a raw deal. He can seemingly do no right.

Things are inferred of him that, when you delve deeper and look at the evidence available, shows a different man altogether. Perception. Thompson's perception in the railway world has been damaged for decades by assumptions such as this.

I will source Mr Knox's book - thank you for the pointer. Please allow me some time to consider your further points for review.

I completely agree with that latter point.

The topic of the conversions always generates heat and none more so than the choice of 4470. I have an interesting excerpt from an article written by Dick Hardy which I will quote later.

 

That is a gross assumption on a number of levels. Particularly as Thompson once retired in 1946/7 had no real say in Hardy's career whatsoever - and Hardy when he knew Thompson and both were still working, was still an apprentice.

I rather think you are backtracking to fit a story around facts, Mr Lplus. You cannot possibly say those things without actually delving into Thompson's mind.

 

One small note to the above: NZ was a narrow gauge system, so multi-cylinder locos were rare (though not completely unknown) on account of the restricted space between frames; similarly, many of the small to medium Victorian and Edwardian locos that would archetypally have been two inside cylinders in Britain were outside-cylindered in NZ.

NZ did have one class of loco with Gresley valve gear; a 4-6-2+2-6-4 Beyer-Garratt. They were markedly unsuccessful, though some of the reason for that was unrelated to the valve gear. Somewhere I have a picture of one in operation with the "piano" removed and all the conjugating levers exposed, which can't have done wonders for maintenance.



Source: http://mp.natlib.govt.nz/detail/?id=33816&l=en See Original caption below.


In Britain, Maunsell built a number of three-cylinder engines that were clearly "medium" in size (classes N1 / U1 / K1 / W). If you haven't already, it is worth reading Holcroft's "Locomotive Adventure" that gives a lot of background to the genesis of those designs and also the comparative trials between class N and N1, which gives a lot of information (for pre-war conditions) about the relative strengths and weaknesses of two vs. three cylinder variants of otherwise identical designs. I think those trials - in Britain at least - would form the only true opportunity to evaluate two and three cylinder designs while removing as far as possible any other sources of variation.

Tom

Original Caption to image above:
G class steam locomotive, NZR 98, Garratt type, [ca 1928]
Reference Number: APG-0247-1/2-G

No 98, a G class steam locomotive originally built by Beyer Peacock (Manchester, England), type 4-6-2 + 2-6-4, which was in service from June 1929 to September 1937. One of 3 imported, this type of locomotive was the first and only one in New Zealand to have a mechanical stoker, and also the first to employ power reversing, exhaust-steam injection, and grease-lubricating driving axle-boxes. The locomotives were not successful in NZ as the Gresley conjugated valve gear gave trouble, and the mechanical stoker couldn't handle the irregular sizes of unscreened local coals, and so they had little service. In 1937 they were cut up to provide component parts for 6 "G" class "Pacifics" constructed at Hillside Railway Workshops. Because of further difficulties with these modifications they were confined to freight service on the Midland and South Lines (South Island). Withdrawn 1956. Photograph taken by Albert Percy Godber, probably ca 1928, after arrival from England and during assembly. See "When steam was king" by W W Stewart and "Register of New Zealand Railways steam locomotives, 1863-1971" by W G Lloyd.