LNWR locomotives

i disagree with most of that (#40)

Fowler never designed a loco in his life .Anderson pulled the strings .

the Claughtons and Lanky 4-6-0 s were the best locos on the line , and both had their problems . the Georges were better than the Compounds until the centre bearing was removed .
the MR 0-6-0 was not as good as a Jumbo - although they had the advantage of youth

but the Midland was the dominant force and Derby got it's way

the NW men objected to double heading 300 ton loads . the Compounds were not built for high speed , long distance slogs and reliability suffered .

Crewe resented having to work in ways they believed were wrong - and for the West Coast the new way was wrong .

things got better when the Scots came on the scene .they had an engine that could do the job - for a while at least .

it took an outsider to make the thing work .Staniers great talent was man management

 

Thank-you to the posters who identified further LNWR-linked heritage railways and drew attention to the LNWR Society.

Looking further into LNWR loco history, it is evident that Whale and Bowen Cooke focused investment on the building of larger locos, able to pull heavier trains. After 1902, the LNWR built no more 0-6-0s and no more new small tanks. That helps to explain why the smaller LNWR engines became extinct under BR some years before comparable classes from the Midland, L&Y and Caledonian. If a Webb 2-4-2T had survived, it should have been useful for 4 or 5 coaches on a heritage line.

 

the LNWR 0-6-0s were much more than goods engines . they were that , of course , but they were the 1st proper mixed traffic engines , capable of speeds in the 70s.
they first appeared in 1858 - the Ramsbottom DX .Goods.
Webb rebuilt them with larger boilers and cabs , and subsequently built the Crested Goods (Cauliflowers) , making a total of over 1000 useful and cheap engines .
they lasted until 1955 . many "lived" for more than 60 years . there were another 800 or so tank locos derived from the original design . the Coal Tank for one .

Webb introduced his 0-8-0 engine in 1892 and production of the 0-6-0s ended in 1902

 

Much of this sounds a bit "football supporterish".

 

Fowler's engines, and they were his as he was the CME, varied enormously. The Midland-derived types were good, but on the Midland where loads were restricted. The restrictions didn't apply elsewhere so they were worked much harder in LMS service and faults showed up which had not been evident previously. They became 'Standard' because they could, with some trimming, work across the whole LMS system, while engines from other Railways were restricted on ex-Midland lines.

Lightweight, frequent services are fine in theory but need many paths, and these were not available over non-Midland routes. Even on the Midland they weren't available between Toton and Brent and long, heavy coal trains, always double headed, often ran block-on-block. Comparison with today's situation with entirely different signalling systems, fewer goods workings and all these fully fitted and running at very much higher speeds simply isn't valid.

To get back to Fowler's engines, the Midland types were adequate with lighter trains but, not surprisingly, struggled with heavier ones (4Fs versus Super Ds and Lanky coal engines doesn't take much figuring out), while new designs varied: the Crabs (Horwich) were excellent, as were the 2-6-4 tanks (Derby). The 2-6-2 tanks (also Derby) were pretty awful, the 0-8-0s (Derby) performed well but were high maintenance, and it was not just the axleboxes; while the Garratts were also high maintenance and very coal hungry. The Scots were good when new but were mostly a North British design with Midland influence. The loco position prior to Stanier definitely was not good and chaotic isn't too much of an exaggeration, see the two types of passenger tanks from Derby; that's why the LMS brought him in instead of making an internal appointment. An engine needs to do more than what it was intended for; it must do it efficiently and economically. That wasn't happening in the 1920s and early 1930s.

It is fashionable the denigrate the Midland and Midland-derived locos but they were built to meet the Midland Railway's unusual circumstances, which they did well enough. They only showed distress when moved away from these conditions into the hurly-burly of normal LMS operation. It is unfair to blame the engines for not doing what they were never designed for, but it is fair to blame the operators who, on the basis of no evidence, thought that they would do so.

 

Not just paths, but station capacity as well. In this era of multiple unit operation, it's easy to forget just how many extra moves were needed at stations with loco hauled trains.

As an example, I'm currently reading part two of the South Western Circle monograph on Waterloo signalling. There is a reference in there that on the August bank holiday of 1900, there were 1,063 train movements in and out of the station. If you assume that they would have taken about 20 hours to occur, that is over 50 movements an hour, or on average about one every 2.5 minutes in each direction. (Since at that time there were six main lines - three up and three down - that means roughly eight trains an hour on each line right through the day). However, on top of that, every double movement (i.e. train arrives - stock departs) requires at least two light engine moves, to attach a loco for departure, and, once released, for the arriving loco to move to be serviced. So the thousand train movements implies another thousand light engine moves around the station, slotted in between the train movements - not to mention any moves to attach or detach horse boxes, carriage trucks etc. It's a scarcely believable level of activity on an entirely manually signalled station.

Tom

 

I would suggest that there was more than a little Southern influence in the original Royal Scots. Certainly if you compare the basic dimensions of the boilers they were very similar.

 

The small engine policy of the Midland was a contributory factor in the Hawes junction accident in 1910, as every train on the S & C had to have pilot assistance to Ais Gill summit, which caused a huge number of light engine movements. Arguably, it could have been a factor too in the Ais Gill accident in 1913 as well, in not providing locos of sufficient power to deal with the gradients on the line.

 

It's often suggested that there was a sort of general influence from the Lord Nelsons, although it doesn't seem to have influenced anything specific.
What's often forgotten by those who are mostly interested in British locomotive history is that NB had a vast experience of building locomotives for overseas, many of them bigger and more powerful than required by British railways.
They would have drawn in their experiences with these locos - for Argentina, India, Australia, etc - as well as other British railways

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Actually, the common denominator between the LMS and Southern was James Clayton, as suggested by Tom earlier. His defection southwards from Derby meant that there were many similarities in appearance between the two Railways' products, witness the L1 (SR) and 2P (LMS). but appearance was where things generally finished: the 2P was a very mediocre engine while the L1 was a very capable machine.

 

I'm actually with you on the broad thrust, but I do think sometimes there is some exaggeration to make a good story.
Is there any contemporary (i.e. written and published before Stanier's appointment) evidence that the loco situation on the LMS was anything like a crisis? I know that with hindsight that's how people like Cox wrote it up, but that's hindsight.
Were there many services which simply couldn't be run? Was there freight not shifted, or towns whose passenger trains were always late?

On the WCML, I accept Class 6 (or 7 as BR would say) engines were needed (and even some 7/8), and running the services with Class 4 and (not especially satisfactory) Class 5 locos wasn't going to be sustainable.
Of course, the CMEs had plans for the WCML even before the Scots. Hughes wanted electrification, and when that was turned down designed a Pacific loco. Fowler also wanted electrification, and in its absence investigated express passenger Garratts and designed (and even started building) a compound Pacific.

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Frame cracking and centerbearing.
Edward Talbot in the LNWR 0-8-0 book states that center-bearings were inactivated starting before 1925 .
E.A. Langridge considered them useless and the rest of that strange central frame Webb -thing was removed around 1945.
There are two pictures (plate 201 and 204) showing the screw holes where taken out centerframe had been supposed to transmit up to 30 tons force to cylinder via a perpendicular 1 inch plate and then the mainframe .
It looks like eigth holes of 10 to 12mm diameter.
Webbs most ugly creation
This is one explanation and I find it more likely than Anderson had the bearings inactivated to protect his inefficient compounds.
Pure footballing but fun.

 

How is it hindsight? Stewart Cox was there at the time - and before - as was Roland Bond. I don't always trust Cox's opinions but a lot of the evidence was memoranda from him to S.J. Symes detailing the faults of various classes - your contemporary evidence. The LNWR Claughtons came in for much criticism, as did the L&YR Dreadnoughts; the difference was that he did not think a satisfactory solution to the ailments of the former was viable, although it was with the latter. His assessment of the Austin 7s, a new class still being delivered at the time, was damming.

There was no clear policy regarding loco design, which flitted from one idea to another. The Derby 2-6-4 tanks had long lap / long travel valve gear; the slightly later Derby 2-6-2 tanks reverted to short lap / short travel valves and were poor tools. The reasons? the 2-6-4Ts had Fowler's sanction while the 2-6-2Ts came under Anderson's influence. There were effectively two CMEs pulling in different directions, hence the chaos.

 

I am assuming that Anderson was kept out of the way of the 2-6-4 tanks, Crabs, and NBL did the same when they built the Scots, these three seemed to be only pre Stanier LMS types that were any good.

 

Not being well versed in LMS matters - what were the board doing at the time? Were there bigger fish to fry that meant that, relatively speaking, matters in the loco department dropped down the priority list? Or was it that the key performance indicators for the board - which I guess were around availability and costs - remained such that the management issues were under the radar as far as the board were concerned?

Edit: I’m guessing that the run up to and aftermath from the 1926 strike must have been a major concern for any board at the time.

Tom

 

There was a huge amount of animosity between the two biggest constituents, the Midland and LNWR. The North Western was the bigger (slightly) of the two and they called themselves The Premier Line. Crewe resented what amounted to a Midland take over with their methods of working being imposed on the North Western, and also the Midlands Red livery. For quite a while after the grouping Crewe continued to turn out locos in black.

Midland designs were standardised and Derby, rather than Crewe, dominated locomotive policy. The LMS was probably too big and it took a long time for it to settle down properly, this in-fighting didn't help.

The Midland/North Western rivalry persisted for years, an ex Stockport Edgely man, who was there in the 60s, I know still says they were the Premier Line, and described Midland locos as crap!

I'm not that well versed on the LNER, but they didn't seem to have these problems, the GWR continued more or less unaltered, apart from absorbing some small railways, and the Southern always came across to me as a well run, well managed kind of outfit which just got on with it and focused on electrification.

 

Hi,
Thanks for your response. Your contributions are always informed and interesting.
A couple of points I'd like to know more about:
1. The contemporary point: yes, Cox was there. As such his recollection is invaluable, although as you say not infallible. Nevertheless, there's a big difference between actual documents from the mid 20s, and his recollections written thirty or more years later. If you know how the story ends, it colours how you remember the events that happened. I'm currently reading a history of the American Civil War. There's a big difference between the correspondence written in 1862 about the relative positions of the Confederates and the Union, and recollections from afterwards knowing how it turned out, even when written by the same people! Their recollections suggest they never thought Britain would recognise the independence of the South, for example, whereas their letters of 1862 suggest it's a certainty that Britain will...
So, what's interesting is what Cox wrote at the time: you suggest he identified the problems with some classes immediately and we have the documents, which is quite a different thing to remembering that decades later.

2. While there is evidence that people thought some of the new standard classes were problematic, and that their flaws were discussed at the time, this is not the same as saying there was a crisis in motive power. Evidence of an actual crisis would be reports of goods not moved, or passengers being habitually late or trains cancelled. Whereas I've never actually seen a contemporary report of such problems (they may exist, but the books narrating this period don't quote them). In fact, rather than complaints about it taking too long to get from Liverpool to Leeds, or of coal piling up in S Wales not being shifted to Lancashire, what I have read is reports of people saying their services were much improved in the mid 20s (e.g. in SW Scotland). Also, despite the real problems with some of the new standard classes, the LMS loco availability was much improved over this period, because the new engines were still much better than what they replaced, and Fowler and co did some tremendous work reorganising the maintenance regime.

Of course a lot of this is simply follow a loco-centric focus of history. Worth also remembering that:
- WCML expresses were a very small proportion of LMS services.
- passengers were probably more interested in comfortable new carriages than the engines up front anyway
- the 1920s were a difficult period for lots of reasons having nothing to do with railways

Anyway, sorry for long post.

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Yes, I was thinking that part of the answer to @Jamessquared question was that the LNER and SR were to a great extent mergers of complements, the GWR was, as you say, scarcely a merger at all, whereas the creation of the LMSR was much more ambitious in scope and scale, being a merger of competitors with very different traditions. So you would expect the digestion problems to be much more acute and to be spread across all functions of the business.

 

I thought the differences between the 2-6-4T and 2-6-2T wasn't especially Fowler v Anderson (presumably Anderson ordered both types) but was differences between people in the drawing office re long vs short travel valves? I can't remember the names, but I think one ex Furness?
Stanier of course also turned out disappoiting 2-6-2Ts!

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I know I'm on a hobby horse, but I think "the only ones that were any good" is rather hyperbolic!
Many of the others did good work despite their flaws (4P, 4F, 7F, 2P which personally I despise but which GSW men loved), while e.g. the Garratts did the job they were designed for for over two decades.
I'm not trying to claim Fowler was a genius or Anderson gave the LMS wonderful service, just that the "chaos/crisis" then "golden age" with Stanier story which is often trotted out requires quite a lot of things to be ignored.

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