Fire Risk

Probably fair, but I'd expect NR to assume worst case at this time of year. I'm not quite sure how you'd measure it, but I'd have thought fire risk could be assessed in terms of ashpan and chimney "leakage" levels at a given level of working and speed - a measure that might inform choices of loco and duty.

 

Yes, I think the caveat should be dragged out of the T&Cs and given prominence.

 

Of course NR carries overall responsibility for the integrity of the network and will assume worst case scenario. What needs to be averted is a situation where episodes like the one under discussion make the 'worst case senario' a fixture of the calendar.
This surely involves the operators proactively taking greater ownership of fire risk assessment for steam traction against commonly established criteria forming part of relevant RSSB standards.
One example given up thread is ashpan dousers.
Another might be specifications for effectively assessing spark containment. If I look back 25 years or so I seem to remember part of the mainline certification process involved a loaded test run in hours of darkness for a visual assessment of spark arresting effectiveness. Is that still the case?
Advances in technology must make it fairly straightforward to get a visual record of ashpan security too.
The overall point being if more isn't done by those with the agency, there must be a strong chance something blanket will be permanently imposed by NR.

 

Without a doubt.

 

Given modern equipment and fire risks in the hotter drier summers we are having I suggest that NR needs to do some major work with lineside vegetation and that has nothing to do with running steam

 

There is plenty of room for informed or uninformed speculation about how much worse heatwaves and droughts will get, and how quickly. Plenty of trustworthy sources make very clear that they certainly will get worse. How main line train operators (of all kinds) and heritage railways deal with the resultant fire risk (and other consequences) now and in future seems an entirely appropriate topic for this thread.

 

Vegetation is a problem, undoubtedly. However by far the greater balance of hazard and threat in terms of fire risk emanates from a steam loco. Expecting NR to do over much to manage their element is a fools errand. The steam loco owner/operators want to be on the mainline far more than NR does so the onus is surely on the former to find better and new solutions, whether physical or simply being self restricting when circumstances demand.
As an example, and fully expecting a 'pile on', how wise was it to move 44871 from a region where it was operating unrestricted 350 miles south into an area that was already under some restrictions and clearly under imminent threat of the level being escalated? Fair enough there was a will to ensure RTC was able to provide a steam hauled train on 12th July but why did caution not intervene?
Being a responsible operator has to be about controlling the controllables applying all the foresight one can.

 

As far as I remember, all variants of class 33 were built with ETH.

With two locos, there should surely be sufficient electrical supply for the train. Unless of course, the ETH equipment has been removed, or not maintained/certified, or simply does not meet current regulations.

Even if a rear loco were required, one 33 each end two separate drivers required, no higher crew cost than having a 47 on the back.

If my memory serves, Waterloo - Exeter services which ran with 9 mk1 in summertime, were restricted to 8 mk1 during the heating season.
So one 33 should have sufficient 'hotel power' for up to 8 mk1 equivalent.

If there were 1x33 each end, the ETH of the rear loco should be sufficient. If there is a steep section requiring full traction power both ends, the driver of the trailing loco ought to be able to switch off ETH for short portions of the journey.


Mind you, it is over 30 years since I had any dealings with the running of cl33.

 

Why? Not heard of any fires started due to high temperatures.

 

Stratford last Friday?

 

Is it definitely a fire that started on the railway though? Public media doesn't make it clear.

 

https://www.greateranglia.co.uk/travel-information/service-disruptions/service-disruption-stratford

There are a couple of photos of the damage on the Greater Anglia website, it certainly looks serious and significant.

 

If you want to consider fire risk from locos other than steam, hang around somewhere on the third rail network after dark and you'll see how many sparks the contact shoes can throw off.

 

The point is that irrespective of the cause there is now a lot of hi-tech equipment and cabling hidden in the undergrowth, and given the current climate an increased likelihood that it will catch fire at times

 

Looking at what seem to be fresh cut bushes, it seems that box must have been well into a lot of vegetation.

Bryan

 

Very likely, as vegetation grows.

I was in Gateshead recently, looking across the Tyne. On my right was the Tyne Bridge, with very clean stonework. Ahead was the ECML viaduct entering Newcastle from the north, on my left the High Level Bridge. Both were bedecked with shrubs, clinging on with grim abandon to the vertical faces. If that's how Grade 1 Listed structures are looked after, I'm unsurprised that there's new jungle forming elsewhere and contributing to these burn ups

 

It was the same leaving Lime Street up Edge Hill bank on Saturday, one of the most significant sites for railway archaeology - bedecked with Buddleia and small trees.

 

The combination of rampant vegetation and loads of vulnerable lineside equipment and cables is the crucial issue. Steam locos are one cause of fires, but there are plenty of other causes. One of my journeys a few years ago on the WCML was severely delayed by a lineside fire when no steam loco had been anywhere near.