North Yorkshire Moors Railway General Discussion

I think D821 and D7029 (and D8568) moving further south was more to do with the location of the DTG people who maintained them - mostly based south of Birmingham - rather than a souring of the relationship. When they were first preserved around 1981 the NYMR was one of the only preserved railways who would entertain main line sized diesels.

 

I don't know about bizzare but very sad. We know that 2253 only goes out when qualified crew (loco inspectors) are available. 926 is the only other currently serviceable steam loco in traffic and as usual its availability is somewhat erratic. Everything else is in bits and looks like staying that way for the immediate future.

Peter

 

Not fitted at the moment.

 

I can remember a conversation about air receivers on the Hymek not being certified and the loco needing to be lifted to gain access to them. Also as the 80s progressed the steam fleet improved with the completion of 45428, 6619 and 80135 getting sorted out. Passenger numbers soared and the mileage available to diesel groups plummeted, suddenly the peak summer school holiday season became all steam to balance out the passenger numbers between trains. Cliff Brown brought DVL to the railway, swiftly followed by Repton. At the start of the decade there were only enough serviceable carriages to form two trains, the four DMU vehicles and two spare mark 1s made up the third set at galas. By the end of the decade there were three sets of service carriages plus the dining train, which only operated evening services, because demand for normal passenger services didn't allow any paths in daytime for it. Eventually even this last bastion of diesel haulage fell to the mantra of an all steam timetable. Diesel gala passenger numbers fell because they ceased offering anything new or different and the railway could make more operating as a normal weekend so they got axed, after that the DPS went too.

Sawdust.

 

The NYMR has had substantial yearly losses for several years running; this is not conspiracy theory, but the NYMR's own accounting. The NYMR needs substantial contributions from supporters to make up for those operating losses; this also is not conspiracy theory, but a written recognition from the NYMR Trust. I could go on in that vein.

What you don't seem to be able to take on board is that people who are unhappy with the current board are fundamentally motivated by their concern for the ongoing viability of the NYMR. That concern is in large part driven by the foregoing - and the ongoing viability is in the hands of the current board.

Noel

 

For clarity I assume that your references to the board are to the elected Trust Board that is accountable for the strategic direction of the charity and its long term financial viability (as distinct from the PLC board which for over 30 years has had delegated responsibility for the operation of the railway).

 

For clarity, to whom are you responding?

Sawdust.

 

Looks like post #11825 to me.

 

I actually wasn't distinguishing; my "current board" was just quoting the instance thereof in @Bikermike's post.

Noel

 

Jnc’s post about “the current board” That raises the legitimate question about which one?

 

In turn, the quibbling over "which board" seems meaningless. The main function of the Trust Board now seems to be to subsidise the actions of the PLC board by handing over its reserves to subsidise the effects of the "professional" management's lack of ability to run the railway's operations at anywhere approaching a break-even level. that lack of ability, to my mind at least, rather hamstrings any thought of providing strategic direction.

 

D7029 estimated to be 5 years away from running .

 

Both have spect periods at OOC pre closure ,especially 7029

 

I suggest who does what is important not least because of the interaction with organistions whose confidence in the NYMR's corporate governance is critical (such as the ORR, Arts Council England , its lending bank and the auditors). When the PLC was created many years ago it was charged with running the railway as a service to the owning Trust. The duties of the elected directors of the Trust and the board of the PLC are different. That's a consequence of charity and company law. The Trustees are accountable to the members and the Charity Commission for achievement of the Trust's public benefit charitable purposes. The PLC directors must run the PLC in the interests of all its shareholders, not just the Trust, and they have specific duties towards the PLC's employees, creditors etc. The Trust board sets objectives for the PLC and holds it to account for its performance but although it owns all the voting shares in the PLC it cannot not exercise that voting control in a way that would cause the PLC directors to be in breach of their statutory duties.

 

I don’t think anyone is suggesting that breach of statutory duties is a problem, or even that if PLC directors said “this is a problem”, the trust would exercise those powers in that way. I do however think that there is an issue with the seeming reluctance of Trustees to exert their influence over the PLC in pursuit of the charitable objectives, especially those related to heritage.

More fundamentally, the structure seems (as with many public sector arms length organisations) to operate so as to dilute accountability. The Trust is the organisation with public accountability, yet decision ownership is deflected to the overlapping and wholly controlled PLC board as if it’s beyond the responsibility of the Trust.

 

The Trust sets annual objectives for the PLC so the Trustees are accountable for their choice against the backdrop of the charitable purposes.

 

Precisely what I mean about dilution of accountability. There is a huge gap in that relationship, which is right at the core of what we're discussing here.

 

But does the Trust ever hold the Plc accountable in any way? The primary job of the Plc is to run the NYMR in a way that enables it to at least break even, to provide an adequate and reliable train service and to ensure that the Trust's assets are adequately maintained. Is it really possible to argue that it fulfilled these duties in the last four years? I would suggest that it hasn't, but has the Trust laid down conditions that require any changes in the Plcs's approach? Again, I would suggest not, perhaps because that it cannot exercise that voting control in a way that would cause the PLC directors to be in breach of their statutory duties, however badly they may be fulfilling their side of the contract. In other words they have been rendered toothless.

In other words it has become an operation where there is no real control or accountability for the Plc.

 

Or alternatively the Trustees have concluded that the PLC is doing an acceptable job in very challenging circumstances. It’s not as if the NYMR is unique in having incurred substantial losses in recent years while it’s succeeded in reducing the size of secured loans taken under a previous regime.

 

A director's statutory duties to minority shareholders, external stakeholders or staff do not of themselves preclude taking difficult decisions. Indeed, part of the director's duty is to run a solvent company and to avoid enforced liquidation; the only legal duties to employees are those imposed by employment law and such duties to external funders, while absolutely to be taken seriously, are matters of the conditions (=contracts) associated with grants.

Reference to minority shareholders is moot when there is no market in the shares, and no dividends are paid.

I wrote above that there is an accountability gap. That gap is of the creation of the Trust board where they simultaneously exercise control of their subsidiary, yet do not accept accountability for the acts of that subsidiary. The RACI model (Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed) is useful here. To recap, in sequence*:
* Accountable - the person or body that is accountable for the thing being done
* Responsible - the person or body that does the thing
* Consulted - those people or bodies that need to be consulted about what is to be done
* Informed - those people or bodies that need to told about the decision when it is taken

Importantly, the model is hierarchical and requires that accountability cannot be split between people or bodies.

In the NYMR context, the Trust board remains Accountable for what happens on the railway. They delegate to the PLC Board, who are Responsible for the day to day operations under the PLC. This structure works in other places, but causes problems where the two bodies are seen to have conflicting interests and therefore to need to be managed as if completely separate. As seen in many public sector bodies, the introduction of such an arms length relationship means that the minister/department/council accountable for delivery of the policy can say "but the arms length organisation did it", as if that's a complete answer for what a body which only exists for the purposes of discharging a delegated function.

So, while @jnc may have been slightly naive in his observation, and arguably wrong in detail, he was absolutely right to focus on the Trust board. Indeed, quoting @Lineisclear, "the PLC board which for over 30 years has had delegated responsibility for the operation of the railway". Responsibility, not Accountability.

* - I presume the model is known as "RACI" rather than, strictly correctly, "ARCI", to avoid distraction.