North Yorkshire Moors Railway General Discussion

A loose crosshead cotter and a steam leak according to a post elsewhere. Can’t vouch for whether it is correct or not.

 

Unusually I agree with you! I'm sure there's a lot of support for the idea that heritage railway companies should be run as what you call hybrid businesses but perhaps the better comparison might be the members' preservation societies that many had as their origins. I've suggested many time in the past that limited companies and incorporated charities are far from ideal vehicles for heritage railways. There is no such thing as a hybrid option. If their directors and trustees ran them the way you suggest they could be personally liable or face other sanctions such as disqualification. Incidentally the PLC is barred from paying a dividend to its shareholders. They were never possible as the prospectuses issued to purchasers made very clear.
That's why I advocate conversion to a Community Benefit Society which can be run in the interests of its member community including paying interest on their investments. That model offers the opportunity of your wish to see a member centric "hybrid" and mine to see effective corporate governance with financial sustainability. Potentially "Happy Days!"

 

What do you reckon would be the cost in conversion to a Community Benefit Society ? How difficult would it be in practice ?

 

So if you believe that conversion to a CBS is the best option, and bearing in mind that until very recently you were on the board with a position of great influence, why has the process of conversion not been started?

 

Having been closely involved in the process at the SVR I know success requires a board level champion. Obviously despite my conviction that it’s the right thing to do I’m no longer in a position to take on that role. 60044 is right to query the cost. If external lawyers were used extensively it would probably be around £50k. Against that the short term financial benefit should be many times that. However relying on volunteers with relevant experience to do much of the work would keep costs down.

 

Looks like the sort of thing A.I. would be good at, with as you say suitable volunteers - could be a lot less. Has this ever been discussed by the Trust Board ?

 

Deckchairs.

I say that because such a conversion would likely take several years (see other lines which have undertaken such a conversion), and the NYMR may well, sadly, not have that long to go.

Noel

 

https://www.nymr.co.uk/agm/

The AGM announced, and the accounts are out. I will let those who can do better than me with these documents comment.

 

I assume they are not expecting many attendees to travel by train to the meeting at Grosmont Classroom.
What time is the first arrival into Grosmont from Pickering?

Or is it on a non running day?

 

Non running day (despite it being half term) and not accessible by public transport. I guess it means they're not distracted by running services while the AGM takes place.

Like @Neil W J Smith I'll let others more competent in understanding accounts to comment, but £290,000 profit sounds good until you read on and see the Trust bailed out the PLC to the tune of half a million quid. So really a £210,000 loss rather than the £280,000 of the previous year.

 

I've spent only 30 minutes (so far) and on a flickering phone screen but the accounts whilst i'm sure will be compliant with the law they are, IMHO, grossly misleading to ordinary members and supporters.

The most noticeable feature has aleady been identified by 5944's posting above but I think it worth emphasising. The PLC report a profit of £290,703 BUT for absolute clarity that was an actual true loss of £209,297 because the Trust bailed them out to the tune of £500,000.

The trust is therefore half a million pounds poorer in order to bail out PLC management failures.

The PLC turnover is quoted as £7.7 million. Of that figure a massive £2.7 million is attributed as "administrative costs". How can any organisation justify spending 35% of turnover, that's turnover not profit. on admin?

The CEO personally cost us £99.000 (including pension contributions).

The maintenance deficit, ie work that is needed which hasn't been carried out at is estimated at £262,000 not including specific provision for bridge 42,

Their are additional liabilities of £400,000, though repayment of these is deferred until 2028-2036. The reports confirm that Santander loans have been "renegotiated" to reflect the current inability to repay them.

On non-financial matters the over reliance on non-steam locos is staggering, Diesel consumption increased from 117,000 litres to 172,000 litres. Conversely Coal consumption fell from 1767 tonnes to just 1082 tonnes.

There is no provision for the missing £400,000 requited to repair Bridge 42, though as our resident defender of the current management will doubtless point out the report only reflects the position upto Feb 2026.

That Feb 2026 date is the most significant point of all. NONE of all these appalling figures allow for the even greater failures to attract business through the 2026 summer season.

The PLC through accounting system smoke and mirrors can legally claim a so-called "profit" but true losses continue to mount and both CEO and Trustees in office during that period, headed by Lineisclear of this parish, should hang their heads in shame.

 

On one specific item, I am deeply surprised that there is no reference to a provision for Bridge 42 as the liability (if not the full scale) became apparent during the year reported. From my own experience, auditors have wanted to know of events after the year end that may affect the reliability of the accounts to present a true and fair view for the coming year.

More generally. I have yet to open any of the accounts and am unlikely to for a while. However, I suggest that the true accounting position will be more apparent from the Trust accounts than the PLC, bearing in mind that the Trust is the parent organisation. From experience of dealing with charity accounts elsewhere, the mandated formats are often difficult to work with (being charitable).

 

Speaking generally - Just because 1 person on a Board has an opinion, even a strong opinion backed by data, that doesn't mean it's going to happen. That's kind of the point of a Board...

 

I've moved on to the Trust accounts and they are revealing, though no great surprises.

I won't go into the same analysis as previously but basically it's 48 pages of blether with finance information aplenty, but as is usual with corporate bodies somewhat convoluted on format to meet legal requirements.

There is considerable reference to Bridge 42 but no indication of a financial solution.

Some figures which personally I find concerning are as follows.

Steam mileage was down a massive 48%
Income claimed as increased "by 21% since 2019" which is of course a manufactured claim designed to mislead. Just 21% over eight years even carefully ckosen? It doesn't even keep pace with inflation.
More telling is income since 2024/25 is down 4%
Membership down by 7% in a year,
Fundraising down 33% in a year. Their solution is to employ, and doubtless pay through the nose for, a Corporate fundraising consultancy.
Trust liabilities up from £2 million to £2.7 million, net current liabilities almost doubled from £187k to £344k.

There is one statement which, were it not farcical, might raise a wry smile. "The Corporate Leadership Team continues to le led successfully by our CEO Laura Strangeway"

Apologies as I've probably missed other revelations, but I'm still trying to read from a phone screen.

 

IIRC, the last visit of Flying Scotsman took place in Autumn 2925, and brought in around 400K of late season income the railway would not normally have, and which doesn't seem likely to replicate this year - so that distorted the reality of the position. On that basis the underlying annual deficit was really closer to 500-600 last year before 60103 rolled into the rescue. It is hard to imagine this year will prove to be any better.

As for liabilities, it has been said that as works on bridge 42 have been postponed for a year, those liabilities will now have to add the rental costs for the propping material for the bridge, and what about the rebuild of 75029's boiler.

The other points of concern are just as telling as to how bad things are, and even more telling there hasn't been any mention of savings that have been made. It really is time for a new management team who should at least have some idea of how to turn things round. The present one clearly doesn't.

 

This is actually quite funny!

 

"Please note that this year there will only be the formal legal business of the PLC and Trust at the AGM. There will be no presentations and very limited opportunities for questions. We intend to hold a separate meeting in the first quarter of 2027 to discuss the 2026 year and plans for 2027"



Assume it will be finished by 10:05 and await detailed presentations in 2027 which is very shabby

 

Yes that's true, but if it had been even considered and then rejected at board level, I think John would've mentioned it.
I think you probably underestimate John's persuasive powers...see gift aid and delay repay

 

As I think I have pointed out before, most of the major successful grant applications in recent times were written by volunteers. Perhaps more recent ones that have failed were not. Just sayin'!

 

I believe it is perfectly acceptable for a parent Trust to provide financial input to its trading subsidiary company. For projects such as major infrastructure works and locomotive overhauls.

But it is imperative that the Trust maintains its income, from a range of streams, above the level of financial input to the subsidiary, and also builds its reserves. That is the hard bit.

In return for financial input to the subsidiary, the Trust does have a responsibility to itself to ensure its trading subsidiary behaves itself!