MR Design Philosophy; Henry Fowler, ex-42424 - New Build Fowler Tank

Harking back to my childhood beside the Midland main line, before the widespread introduction of class 7 motive power, a frequent combination would be a Black 5 or a Jubilee piloted by a 2P or a Compound.
Plenty of 5's and Jubilees around,...in need of a pilot, over the S & C for example?

Back on topic however, wasn't the Fowler 2-6-4T one class of Fowler loco that crews appeared to actually like?

Also, when you look back at the many and varied duties they covered, they could cover quite considerable distances. Manchester to Sheffield via the Hope Valley line, and the Central Wales line for instance. Some were even equipped with water scoops for the more long distance workings.

Presumably when modifications are considered for the 21st Century, it is things like rocker grates and hopper ashpans to ease servicing.

 

The 2Ps were often used as pilots on heavy trains, and were very unpopular with the train engine crews. They were alright going up the hills when speed was low, or getting the train on the move, but as speed rose the train engine found itself not only pulling the train but pushing the 2P as well. The layout of the steam passages around the cylinders was horrendous and this, coupled with their short travel, short lap valve gears, meant that they soon ran out of pull at higher speeds. They were very good on maintenance and could run high mileages between repairs, but this is put down to their low work output - it was impossible to work them hard - so they never wore out.

As to the Fowler tanks, many enginemen reckoned these were the best of the 2-6-4 tanks and each succeeding design was slightly inferior. The quality of the originals was such that, while the BR version was considered poor by comparison, it was still a very good machine. Famously the Fowler tanks have been timed at over 90 mph. They steamed and rode well and were amazingly rattle free. A very good engine and, as stated, excellent for preserved line use. Apart from anything, they were intended to run in reverse, which isn't the case with a tender engine.

 

That's quite an endorsement of the Fowler tanks, given the generally high regard that the 80xxx tanks are held in.

The Fairburn tanks were, after initial trepidation, well received by Southern crews, which - given the long tradition of excellent passenger tank engines on the Central section dating back to Stroudley days - indicates that there can't have been too much wrong with those locos either. Some of them were built at Brighton, of course! The platforms of some country stations on the Central section had "P4" painted at the ends which indicated the stopping points for crews on the Fairburn tanks so that the water cranes lined up with the tank fillers.

Tom

 

My understanding was that the 4MT 2-6-4T and Patriot were popular because their bottom half was the secret of their success - especially the cylinder size and valve settings; sadly the later changes failed to follow these through hence consequent "improvements"proved to be the opposite. Whilst Fowler was much derided because of his support of Midlandisation (e.g. imposing MR axle-boxes on the Beyer Garretts and BP's consequent wish not to be associated with the locos) his cylinder / valve designs were one part of his work which appears not to be fully recognised for the success they proved to be.

 

But we've been told in an earlier post that the valves etc. on his 2P were a bit naff so this success was not universal to his designs.

 

The 2P designs may have been "naff" but I have been told that Fowler commissioned the drawing office to review the "standard" designs and the first beneficiary of that review was the 4MT 2-6-4T design. In that context I refer you to "Under 10 CMEs - Volume 1" (Pages 95 - 104) by E.A. Langridge that may provide better details of the work undertaken.

 

The problem was that Henry Fowler was not master in his own department. Although he was nominally in charge, many of his duties were usurped by James Anderson and it was he who held very conservative views regarding valve events, and was reluctant to move away from 'standard' components, axle boxes being an example. He had been Chief Draughsman previously but was then in charge of Motive Power, so design was no longer anything to do with him, but he basically stipulated exactly what would be built, even down to details.

Fowler's problem was less that he wouldn't progress design, but that he allowed himself to be over-ruled in what were, in reality, decisions that were entirely his to take.

 

Dunno, you can't expect a senior executive to be expert in every (?any?) technical aspect. I don't think an executive should be criticised for delegating design decisions to subordinate staff if they are not ones he can make himself. The executive's responsibility is surely to pick the right people, and make sure that the output from those people is matching the business needs, and not to do the work himself.

The big problem, of course, is those who are best at climbing the slippery pole of office politics may not necessarily be those who are most technically competent, and not every pole climber may recognise his own technical limitations and take best advantage of the skills of those who don't do office politics but can deliver (assuming the organisation has got them). One might argue that the history of the LMS suggests that it's culture developed very competent office politicians, but that pure technical design excellence wasn't always at the highest level, nor was it very good at making best use of the good people it did have.

These are not problems unique to the LMS: I could tell you some stories from my own experience...

Anyway, I submit the problem was not that Fowler delegated: that was in principle the right thing to do. The problem was with who Fowler delegated to. But perhaps that was the problem of promotion by seniority.

 

That wasn't actually the case.

Fowler was more than qualified for the post as CME and as such did delegate design to his drawing offices, as did all other CMEs; his job was to lay down the specifications and choose which of the DOs' initial designs should be worked out in greater detail and on into production. There is evidence that Fowler might have been quite progressive in his own right: he carried on work started by George Hughes in the form of a pacific design with an allied 2-8-2 for heavy goods traffic, plus a development of the Compound into 4-6-0 form. All were scuppered by Anderson. Anderson, though, was not Fowler's subordinate within the CME's department but was an officer in his own right in charge of the Motive Power department, which was seperate from and independent of the CME's department at that time. Anderson therefore had no responsibility for design work and was effectively poking his nose into another department, and Fowler's failure was in allowing this state of affairs to continue.

JE Chacksfield, I think it was, in his 'Sir William Stanier - A New Biography' (Oakwood Press, 2001, ISBN 0 85361 576 4) relates how Anderson tried the same thing after William Stanier arrived, sending him a request for so many new engines of a specific class to be built. Stanier put the memo in his In tray and left it there. After a few week with no reply, Anderson asked him what was happening. Stanier's reply was along the lines of, "I am waiting for you to supply me with the number of new locos you need and the tasks they are to perform so I can supply the locos you need." And so Stanier decisively took back control of design into his department, something Fowler had failed to do.

Surprisingly, it is reported that Stanier and Anderson got on well together, but the latter retired at the end of the same year that Stanier joined the LMS. Coincidence, or had he realised that his days of power wielding were over? Who can say?

 

Fowler himself once admitted that he had never designed a locomotive in his life.

 

I thought he was basically a gas engineer and admitted this

 

No, he served an apprenticeship in Horwich works under John A.F. Aspinall covering all aspects, but mostly on locomotives. Later he took command of the L&YR's gas department, hence the thoughts that he was a 'gas engineer' only. This was a major holding in those days - most lighting, incuding on trains, being gas. He then moved to the Midland in the same capacity, but was promoted to CME of that company, and, following George Hughes, held that post on the LMS.

He was a very versatile and able engineer and submitted his share of papers to the Civils and Mechanical Engineering Societies. As for locos, his specialty was boilers, and he knew his stuff. People tend to underestimate Henry Fowler, but it wasn't his engineering credentials which were at fault. He was a first class, all-round mechanical engineer, but didn't have the strength of character needed to be CME. He was eventually 'promoted' to research, which had always been his main interest.

 

Fair comment. Just been reading Holcroft which relates to some of this.

Of course actual lines of control and influence in an organisation may not necessarilly follow the organisation chart. It doesn't seem totally unreasonable that the Motive power department should have a power of veto over what the design side offers, as in the compound Pacific, because otherwise you might end up with something quite ridiculous like putting in a request for 75 ton moderate powered tank engines and getting and something totally impractical that weighs twice as much. However if you bear in mind Fowler and the camcelled compound Pacific versus Stanier objecting to Anderson specifying existing classes, do we see a situation where Anderson knew the board would support him against Fowler, but most definitely not against the man they had brought in, Stanier?

 

I take it from the general discussion above that the LMS CME was boss of the workshops, but not the running sheds? That is one way of organising things, but not universal - on some railways, the CME had both shops and sheds under his command.

With regards @Jimc's comment about the traffic department protecting themselves against putting in a request for motive power and getting back something different: that still feels odd to me. The job of the traffic department is to specify the capability of the loco they want according to their prediction of traffic demands; it is then up to the CME (and possibly the Civil Engineer, if the new design is larger than anything heretofore) to suggest a solution. The Board would then consider the costs and sanction or otherwise the planned construction programme - ideally, operating two or three years out from the predicted traffic demand.

All of which suggests to me that while Fowler may have been at fault for not standing up to Anderson, you could also argue that the Board was insufficiently robust in ensuring that each Chief Officer stuck to their own sphere of competence. It wouldn't have happened under HA Walker! Interesting to think how railway history could have turned out had he not left the LNWR in 1912 to take over the running of the LSWR. Specifically, from my meagre knowledge, it seems to me that the LMS was poorly managed at its formation and took a long time to unify into a "single" company in more than name. Perhaps if HA Walker had become General Manager of the LNWR and then the LMS (rather than LSWR and then SR), history may have been different.

Tom

 

Funny, I thought JimC had the requirement for a replacement for the M7s in mind when he commented, in which case Walker's successors gave their CME a wee bit more latitude...

 

As I said, wouldn't have happened under HA Walker!

Tom

 

Basically, this is all true. The LMS seperated the Running and CME Departments, a situation inherited directly from Midland pre-Grouping practice. George Hughes fought against it but realised he wasn't going to win, which probably influenced his decision to take what we now call early retirement.

The Midland situation went back a long way, and was the cause of Richard Deeley's resignation in high dudgeon, allowing Fowler to take the CME position. Deeley realised that the Board would not support him and wouldn't tollerate that; Fowler was appointed on the basis that he would. And much of the Midland senior management found itself at the head of the new LMS system and so perpetuated what they knew. The system was wrong and by the early 1930s, this was obviously so and the Board was forced to resolve it; this involved moving Fowler and bringing in Stanier.

The perpetuation of Midland practice and design was the root cause of many of the LMS's early problems. It must be said that these had worked - and worked well - on the Midland; they just didn't transfer to the enlarged system. For example, Midland practice was to run short but frequent expresses and the operators imposed this on the enlarged system. For these, big engines were unnecessary so Fowler's 4-6-0 Compound and pacific were vetoed by Anderson, and the system flooded with standard Midland Compounds, which were big enough for the expresses envisaged. But the pathing simply wasn't available on the LNWR; traffic density was far too high to run the extra trains this needed, so a return to long, heavy trains was forced on to Anderson, for which the Compounds - which were very good engines for their size - simply weren't big enough. Despite this, Anderson did not want anything as big as the pacific on which Fowler was working and it was he, without Fowler's knowledge, who arranged the trials of GWR 5000 Launceston Castle over the WCML. The result was the abandonment of the pacific and work starting - at North British Loco - on a new 4-6-0 in which Fowler was not involved, the Royal Scots being the result.

Other aspects of Midland practice and design showed up badly once off the parent system, although it had performed well enough there, and goods working was amongst these. The bigest Midland goods engine was the 4F 0-6-0 - known as the 'Big Goods' on theMidland! - and this too was exported to the other LMS Divisions. On the Midland, it had led a a quiet and leisurely life as the Midland enforced pretty low load limits which were well within its capacity. Off the Midland, it was in competition with big, eight-coupled locos and was worked hard, and some design defects, hitherto unnoticed, emeged, such as indifferent steaming and axleboxes which were at the limit of the their capabilities. These, as others, were forced on to the LMS system by Anderson, not Fowler.

To be fair, others had done similar with equal results, although to a much smaller extent. George Hughes filled the need for big engines on the WCML with his own Dreadnought 4-6-0s. These had performed well on the L&YR and it was assumed that they would do the same between Euston and Carlisle. But the L&YR was a line of short runs with many stops and hard climbing, but not high speed; on the long distance non-stop, high speed trains of the LNWR, they performed badly and earned a very poor - and undeserved - reputation.

To return to the bigger problem, the LMS Board realised that promoting someone from the pre-Grouping constituents of the LMS would either excasserbate the problem or simply replace it with a different one, and someone from outside was need, hence William Stanier. The matter of the division between CME and Motive Power was also resolved with the two coming under Stanier's control, just as it always should have been.

 

Does this recent discussion, concerning Fowler but not the tanks, deserve to be moved to a separate thread?

Apropos the Midland policy of short frequent trains not being practicable on the WCML -- it is exactly what happens nowadays, but of course with a very different signalling system. I still wonder whether the capacity problem, which is the main justification for HS2, couldn't be greatly alleviated by running lomger trains. But that's further thread drift.

 

That thought that a new thread was needed to discuss the woes of the early LMS had also occurred to me, Mr Mellish. Perhaps the Moderators might oblige?