O.V.S.Bulleid - The Southern Enigma

Lots of interesting posts regarding Bulleid’s locomotives. My initial research regarding availability and mileages tends to be showing that as built, the MNs in particular are not coming out as poorly as depicted in some of the secondary evidence.

I still need to run it through my availability statistics excel spreadsheet, but I am fairy confident that Bulleid’s Pacifics, at least, aren’t as poor as they have been made out to be. Different, for sure!

 

The way it appears to me, at something of a distance, is that the policy under Maunsell was on the lines of build if you have to for heavier services, but to generally expect electrification to reduce the numbers needed as the fleet aged out. I think you can argue that by the time Bulleid took over that policy was more or less played out, and in spite of electrification the SR still had a rather elderly fleet, which was presumably getting expensive to run.

So I suggest the first aspect of Bulleid's policy, to do something of a refresh of the elderly fleet, presumably with a view to getting the overhaul costs down, ought to be reasonably uncontroversial.

The second aspect, of course, is what he chose to replace them with. One may doubt that he had the Leader in mind in 1937, but I think it fair to suggest the light pacific was a new concept with everyone else's pacifics tons heavier in the wheelsets. It might be interesting to compare the route mileage at different weight restrictions on the various lines. I think I'm right in saying that the other lines only had mixed traffic 4-6-0s down to that sort of axle load. What sort of axle load did the Southern EMUS have? Were they as heavily route restricted as express steam? One may imagine the Southern directors being unwilling to upgrade bridges etc if they were going to be good enough for electric traction.

Which brings us on to the third aspect of how well that policy was implemented...

 

One aspect that is overlooked is why did Bulleid design and build the two diesel locos and the electric locos whist still building light pacifics, you would have thought that the thing that made most sence would have been to curtail the building of steam, and instead build more of the electric, and diesel locomotives, as they would have been viewed as the replacement of steam, especially over the non electrified lines for the diesel, and possible interregional onto electric lines of the inter regional workings,

 

Well, if we take the view that the modernisation plan was rushed, and a better result would have been obtained with more development, then it makes sense to build prototypes whilst still continuing with the old traction. We tend to assume that locomotives that didn't work a full life constituted wasted money, but that's not going to be the case. If the life expired locomotives are sufficiently expensive to run then replacement may be cost effective in a very few years. The BR paper linked in another thread considered that the Merchant Navy rebuilds would pay for themselves by 1962, so if that worked out in practice rebuilding the MNs was justified even with their early withdrawal. One would hope that running cost savings between new locomotives and victorian relics would be far greater than those between original and rebuilt MNs.

 

There is also the consideration that Bulleid was looking to standardise on locomotives to both reduce costs and replace the old Victorian / Edwardian designs by a standard locomotive. Whilst in the outer areas the BB/WC classes replaced a multitude of power classifications the economy of a single locomotive type had cost benefits over the whole class that - in Bulleid's opinion - justified the excessive power that was operated on branch lines - especially those in the South West and Cornwall.

 

In fairness we see a similar thing today with diesel electric traction. Class 66s are used for virtually everything, including short haul and short form trains.

 

You have to consider that the SR put great importance on timekeeping. There was none of the casual attitude to time of the LMS: indeed, around London, even humble cross-London freight trains were time to the minute at critical junctions. In other words, timekeeping applied not only to arrival times at termini, but many intermediate points - essential if you are trying to thread mainline trains through busy suburban network.

In that situation, excess power is always desirable to help make up any lost time. In many cases, a light pacific might have been doing a job that could be handled by a Mogul. But put in an adverse p/way slack and an untoward signal check or two, and the light pacific will get you back on time much more easily. As I said on the other thread, the history of locomotive provision always sees power increase as new generations of locos replace old ones.

Tom

 

It does seem to be a particularly British thing to design a separate form of traction for every possible job, rather one design to do everything, even if it is overpowered for the smaller jobs. Did BR really need so many designs of standard 2-6-0s and 4-6-0s? I really can't see why they built 76xxx and 77xxx. Germany got away with using 2-10-0s on everything, from local branch trains to decent length mainline freights.

 

Yes I think this is a very useful way of looking at it. Within that, or possibly additionally,

There is an aspect relating to the environment in which Bulleid was working---- the war, the expectations re further electrification post-war, possibly a higher degree of planning instability than the other railways faced, the timing of events. Another operating environment issue was dealing with the peak, summer saturdays.

Within the second aspect but linked to the point above, there is the question of whether the SR really needed (say) fifty MNs and a couple of hundred Class 5s. In the mid 50s, my impression is that the Nelsons and Arthurs were almost the backbone of the semifasts and Soton boat trains. Then you have superannuated 4-4-0s knocking around on all sorts of light duties until progressively replaced by Standards and then the Kent Coast electrification. My impression is that the 73xxx Standards on the Southern were well received, hard worked and could do most jobs. So I guess that speaks to the question--was Bulleid's standardisation scheme right in relation to the needs of the railway?

Then there is the implementation question. I like your .....! I guess this starts with the design and level of innovation issues--- almost the counterfactual to the progression from A2 to A1 on the LNER Simon has already written on. Then operating performance. I wonder what it is possible to do with the availability data. What is that data and does it say anything about utilisation? I would like to know about the diagramming of the MNs and Light Pacifics both year round and peak. Also something about patterns-- I have been reading @Maunsell907 and he says that some sheds such as Ramsgate and Brighton seemed to really struggle with availability. Did the light pacifics have a larger than normal proportion of black sheep? And so on.

Then I guess there has to be a chapter on the rebuilding decision. Even if it was relatively low cost, what was the evidence base? And was it transformative in availability terms?

 

My current reading is suggesting not, which is at odds with much of the secondary evidence.

There again, so was my work on Thompson…

 

It is difficult to distil information that was available 70 years past, papers subsequently published and
the multifarious viewpoints of the enthusiast fraternity.

I have always understood that the Light Pacifics were intended to be multi purpose motive power. One
minor item for example, to afford footplate crews reasonable vision when travelling tender first.

I have already mentioned the effect of WWII halting the electrification programme. One of the imminent
issues following that was motive power for the South East, hence the Battle of Britain Class. ( Even with
the new locos allocated to the South East plus BR Standard 4-6-0s it was a case on 1950s Summer Saturdays
for Sheds to turn out everything they had, at times Wainwright 4-4-0s, as well as the more normal Maunsell
rebuilds and Ls and L1s even Q and Q1 0-6-0s )

Simultaneously there was a need for new motive power beyond the intended limit of electrification i.e. to
the west of Salisbury Bournemouth. As with the Kent Coast this was another area where Seasonal passenger
numbers fluctuated ( but without a commuter element as with the Kent services ), hence the West Country
Class.

Yes subsequently West Countries in Winter hauled two coach trains between Halwill Junction and Padstow.
Conversely on Summer Saturdays they took ten coach trains up the long drag from Wadebridge to Otterham.
(Another 4-6-2 working with two coaches occurred on the mid day Eastborne Hailsham shuttle. This was a
fill in turn after working the Down Newspapers from London Bridge. The only time I ventured on the
shuttle motive power was a K 2-6-0. I imagine for the return tender first from Hailsham the crew
would have preferred a WC/ BB to a high sided tender BR4 or 5 4-6-0. )

There has been a post to the effect as to why Bulleid pursued diesel electric and electric power. Again the
1945 electrification report is very clear i.e. freight ( other than cross London ) is to be hauled by electric
locos within the electrification area, similarly passenger services to and from outside the area ( i.e.
steam/electric changeover at presumably Bournemouth, Salisbury and for inter regional services Basingstoke
or Clapham Junction). There is also the suggestion that within the electrification area there might be some
routes that cannot justify electrification, other options would be required, such as diesel electric power.
( I assume other options included closure; despite the map in the end covers showing all routes
electrified, I cannot believe there was any intention to electrify the Elham Valley or Hawkhurst branch for example )
Therefore a mixed traffic diesel electric loco Class might be required, plus also for cross London SR powered
freights ?

It appears probable that in 1943 Bulleid and his team were planning for post war operations taking into
account a renewal of the electrification programme.

Tom has compared Bulleid 4 Standard Classes plus diesel shunter with Riddles/Cox 12 Standards.
(They AFAIK suggested a pacific with large grate was possibly preferable to a 4-6-0.)
I understand Riddles considered a Standard 5MT 4-6-2 . Presumably the Leader was intended to handle the four BR standard
tank Class duties ( all of which had their 2-6-0 equivalents). Bulleid was designing for a comparatively small
Railway ( Salisbury to Barnstaple,Plymouth and Padstow and west of Bournemouth) c. 400-500 locomotives?

I suggest
Q1 for BR 2-10-0
WC/BB for BR 7MT & 6MT 4-6-2 plus BR 5MT & 4MT 4-6-0
Leader for BR 2MT & 3 MT 2-6-0 plus 2MT & 3MT 2-6-2T and BR4MT 2-6-0 & 4MT 2-6-4T
MN for BR8 4-6-2
with hindsight, assuming his four designs were good, apparently pragmatic ?

Perhaps we should praise OVBS’s strategic vision, but as with so many visionaries question much
of the detail.

Michael Rowe

 

Yes, I've always thought that there were too many similar overlapping mid power designs in the Standard range. Would the 75000s not have done for the whole class 3/4/5 tender locos?

 

Any locomotive policy ought to arise out of a three-way conversation between what the traffic manager needs; what the civil engineer will accept; and what the CME can provide. (All within a context of what the finance can afford, of course!)

What I am not sure about is to what degree Bulleid's standardisation arose out of a consensus, or whether it was driven by Bulleid with acquiescence of the other two.

For example, the April 1946 requirement from the Traffic Manager for the Leader was:

Routes and weights to be hauled:

Plymouth to Tavistock or Okehampton: 256 tons
Okehampton to Halwill Junction and Bude: 256 tons
Banstaple and Ilfracombe: 325 tons
Exeter and Exmouth: 384 tons
Bournemouth and Swanage: 320 tons
Brookwood (or similar stabling grounds) to Waterloo: 450 tons​

Speed of trains: 50 - 60 miles per hour
Distance to be run between taking water and coal: 60 miles for water and 120 miles for coal.
​

(From which it should be immediately obvious that what was asked for was way in excess of an M7 replacement!)

The proposal from Bulleid when it was presented to the board in July 1946 was as follows:

In order to meet these requirements [i.e. those from the Traffic Manager] within the limits imposed by the Chief Civil engineer as regards permanent way and bridges, I propose a locomotive in accordance with the enclosed diagram.

This engine will have a maximum speed of 90mph will be able to work goods trains which are normally taken by the Q1 and passenger trains equal to "West Country" engines, and will carry at least sufficient water and coal to run 80 miles between taking water and 150 miles without taking coal. [n.b. - so Bulleid's design proposal was in advance of what the Traffic Manager had requested in terms of range].

The engine weights are so distributed as to enable it to run over the whole of the Company's lines, with the following exceptions:

Wenford Bridge line; Hayling Island Branch; Bere Alston and Callington Line; Rye Harbour branch; Newhaven swing bridge; Dover Prince of Wales Pier; Axminster and Lyme Regis Branch; Isle of Wight Lines, none of which is important.​

Subsequently (October 1946) the Traffic Manager wrote to the General Manager to justify a plan to replace the M7s, though interestingly that letter notes that there were still 104 M7s in existence (25% working empty stock trains between Clapham Junction and Waterloo; and the rest on West Country branch and local services); the proposal in that letter was for 85 locos (i.e. the 25 already proposed, plus another 60). Presumably utilisation and availability had to be better to enable 85 new locos to replace 104 old ones, but it isn't directly specified.

So on the surface Bulleid has proposed a loco that meets the Traffic Manager's specification within weight limits agreeable to the Civil Engineer; though the Traffic Manager's justification is just to replace locos well within the capacity of the new design. What is not clear - and would be I think an interesting avenue to pursue both for the Leader, and also the Pacifics - is how much the Traffic requirement was chicken and how much was egg. Bulleid had clearly been working through ideas for the Leader before the formal Traffic specification, so there is a hanging question for me as to how much - prior to April 1946 - the Traffic Manager had pressed Bulleid for a response to a problem; and how much Bulleid had pressed the Traffic Manager to accept a loco he was designing. I think primary evidence - i.e. Board papers etc - that traced the genesis of each design, and the thinking around the standardisation plan - would be fascinating to follow.

Tom

 

My hunch is that the official documentation will be of limited value in ascertaining the real course of events. If Bulleid had been pressing the Traffic Manager to accept the loco being designed (which is my default supposition), then I suspect the board papers will be quite sparse and will only capture the outcome of a lot of side conversations, not the actual course of those discussions. I suspect that there will hints of what was going on off stage, but little if anything tangible.

 

IMO, Bulleid was a bit like Thompson, both did some very good designs like the B1 and the WC/MN pacifics and some which weren't good, like the L1 tanks and the Leader. The 4DD emu was another, it worked but had a lot of negatives, it was claustrophobic and increased station loading and unloading times.

The Leader was a dead end, it was overweight, very heavy on coal and water and working conditions for the fireman were terrible, temperatures in the firing area reached 50 degrees C.

A ready made solution for the work it was intended for already existed in the LMS 2-6-4 tanks and,IMO, British Railways made the right decision to cut their losses and ditch it

 

not sure that’s totally fair - the prototype proved the L1 was fine, the production ones were built, post Thompson’s retirement IIRC, with compromises in materials that he never signed off on.

 

And therein lies the answer to why it's worth going back to the archives, to get beyond the simple repetition of stories.

In a (very) different context, I came across a controversy over Henry Cort (no, me neither!) and his role in developing iron rolling in the early 19th century. This turned up a really interesting online article by Anton Howes entitled "Does History have a reproducibility crisis", which highlights just how easy it is for myths to get embedded in the historical record without underlying evidence.

 

Probably, but I think you have to assume they were reckoning to replace the entire steam fleet (20,000) or at least everything pre grouping and run at least into the 70s. If you figure they were reckoning to substantially fill the number ranges then there would have been hundreds of each class, so no reason not to have the optimised classes. As it turned out though:

 

That is such a good piece, and very important for anyone like me who attempts to write history. Thanks for pointing it out.