Edward Thompson: Wartime C.M.E. Discussion

I'll have to dig out the full story but they were quite a way down Stoke Bank when Thompson gave his instructions so the loco had to be driven much harder than would normally have been the case. Had they known before Grantham a faster ascent to Stoke Tunnel would have been made, the high speed dash started earlier and the fireman would have ensured everything was hunky dory at his end as well. The crew were expecting nothing more than having to run the train to time and the schedule did not require them to have done any more than they did up to the point Thompson decided they'd have a go at Coronation's 114.
Just found this quote about the run : "Alas, George Haygreen was not told that a record attempt was to be attempted on Stoke Bank. This meant he neither had sufficient speed on the run up Stoke Bank, nor was there a sufficient reserve of boiler pressure. By pushing hard, 113mph was reached but the locomotive had to be pushed hard and the middle big end suffered damage."

 

How would have Driver Haygreen prepared his engine differently? Did the LNER only put the maximum amount of oil in reservoirs if they were going to run at 126mph?

Edit: I see Martin has already picked up on this point.

 

And according to Yeadon, Steady Aim and Straight Deal outlasted most of the Peppercorn Pacifics, so I guess it depends which sound bite you want to choose to support your arguments.

 

..or in other words, it's third hand hearsay, Chinese whispers, amended to suit the opinion of the person repeating it.

 

There's only one way to objectively find out how bad his pacifics were. Shall I start a Facebook page?

 

As an interested observer in this topic and nothing more, it is becoming clear that whatever is said certain posters have reached their opinions of Thompson based upon what they have read (I may be wrong, but I am not aware of anyone on here who was actually there at the time) and they are perfectly entitled to do that.

However what is also apparent is that there does not seem to be any account of events from Thompson’s point of view so whatever the Gresley disciples have wholly accepted and repeat as ‘the truth’ must be taken carefully as it is only one side of what was obviously a very contentious issue. Gresley appears to have been highly respected by his peers and the staff of the LNER and thus I suspect that anything which went against his ways (whether supported by engineering evidence or not) would be perceived as wrong and thus subject to disregard by his followers – it is apparent on here that this perceived slight appears to have reached almost paranoia proportions and I wonder whether this state was perpetuated in the LNER generally as it seems to have followed Bulleid to the Southern with the response to the rebuilding of his pacific’s with Jarvis which is presented again as a personal insult.

Some engineers are popular with their staff others are not, some are charismatic and loved (Gresley, Bullied and Churchward for instance) and some are disregarded and almost vilified (Thompson, Collett). However in both the latter cases I suspect that this is due to both the love for their predecessors but also the lack of any written account giving reasons for decisions from their point of view. So instead we have a situation where history is written by those who have sanctified the predecessor and are suspicious of the successor and their decisions. I am not saying that the writers of the history do not have their position, but there are two sides to every story and in the absence of both, reaching a decision c.70 years after the event is very difficult and thus balance is needed and possibly lacking in this thread.

 

Deliberately missing the point as usual. We are not talking about preparing the engine as in "preparing the engine on shed prior to a days's work" but preparing the engine on the road prior to a high speed run. When 4468 got the record Joe Duddington didn't just dawdle along and then think "I know, I'll go for 126". Likewise Tommy Bray didn't keep the boiler well down the glass and 50 psi off the red line. They knew what was coming and made damned sure that 4468 was in the best possible shape for the record attempt by driving and managing the boiler accordingly. Had Driver Haygreen and his fireman known in advance what was expected, they would have taken similar measures.

 

There was indeed but only one side of the story is ever given and it has taken a very long time for more balanced viewpoints to be given on the matter.

I would be interested to read where you found this account as I have a completely different version of the same story catalogued for the book I am writing. If you could point me in the direction of your source I'd be most grateful to look on it with an open mind.

 

One poster knows and has spoked to people who were. It may be of interest to learn that Thompson was not the LNER's first choice as Gresley's successor. Bulleid was first choice and although the SR gave the LNER permission to approach him, Bulleid declined. JF Harrison (later of 71000 fame) was the next popular choice but his relative youth finally counted against him. Peppercorn was considered next but Thompson used his seniority to ensure Peppercorn didn't get the job.
Here is another quote "According to Col H.C.B Rogers (who in turn cites a number of the LNER Engineers, Harrison, Smedley, Spencer et al), Thompson possessed an ill temper towards his colleagues and was notoriously difficult to deal with. The Drawing office at Doncaster had full height panelling on the walls of the corridors, which Thompson had windows fitted the full length of, so that he could see all that was going on and what people were doing. Those who did not agree with him did not work with him for long."

 

Posting garbage again I see.

 

See my reply to Neil. Perhaps "readied" rather than "prepared" would have been a better word.

 

Why is it deliberately missing the point? Going for the ton is considerably different to running at 126 miles an hour, equally I am not sure why boiler pressure and levels would have led to the middle big end going and the cylinder damage - apart from possibly perpetuating the story that the middle big ends on Gresley pacifics were suspect (but as everyone keeps telling us that is a myth!)

 

And what was the position of these sources were they Gresley men - if so why would they not perpetuate the anti Thompson line as he was perceived to have slighted their leader!

What relevance does Thompson's position in the LNER line of succession have here or his temper - many very talented people are not particularly easy to work with, that doesnt mean they are not taleneted or do things for malicious reasons?

 

That's not exactly a balanced account though, is it? RN Hardy (who was an apprentice under Thompson and knew him personally too - read Steam in the Blood) paints a completely different picture of the man - as does Peter Grafton's book. Kind, considerate and hard working - also sometimes difficult to handle most certainly - but isn't that part and parcel of being human?

So on the basis of one specific account from a well known Thompson detractor you would condemn the man outright without looking further afield for more information and evidence?

Who has universal popularity anyway? Why is that relevant to the question of whether or not Thompson's engineering reputation has been fairly assessed and the history of the piece looked at objectively?

I can't help but feel that the grasping at straws is on the detractors side of the argument. It very much centres on the opinion of the man in order to condemn his machines rather than looking more objectively at the overall picture.

I started out ten years ago thinking exactly the same way as many of the posters here until a friend (a GWR fan) pointed out that equal length connecting rods were used with no qualms on many railways, that the position of the cylinders and the bogie were a reasonable engineering practice (look at De Glehn's Pacifics, Chapelon's and Stanier's just before Thompsons) and that the oft repeated phrase "useless" was being applied to locomotives whose withdrawal came as dieselisation rapidly advanced more than anything else.

It posed the question is the current thinking on Thompson fair, and I decided to read more on the subject, and do some research. I've collated a lot of information from a number of sources and I'm convinced the conventional thinking perpetuated since Thompson's death isn't entirely fair and at times is woefully incorrect.

 

In over 1520 runs of the Silver Jubilee only 10 loco mechanical failures were recorded. That's how reliable the middle big end was. As for the "going for a ton," the speed achieved was 113. The rest of your post shows poor understanding of high speed loco handling. And before you say "neither do you," a great uncle of mine was a top link LNER driver and he told me a lot plus there's plenty of info in books written by footplate crew.

 

Reading garbage potentially I see.

 

The 'going for the ton' was based upon your description, obviously if you had said 113 I would have said that, but hey how that’s semantics.

Ignoring the patronising note of the second part of your post ( to which I suspect I am meant to bite – sorry), I am more than happy to bow to your knowledge (in my mid 30's my direct experience of driving A4's on the east coast main line is sadly lacking) and would be interested in an explanation why low boiler pressure would lead to the bomb proof motion failing.

 

Just picking up on this one aspect: I'd be grateful for further explanation. Other things being equal, divided drive puts a different pattern of stresses on the frames and stays, which might therefore need to be thicker here and thinner there, and it may need a different distribution of balance weights between the driving wheels, but otherwise what difference does it make?