'The Bath and Bristol Christmas Markets'. Thurs. 28 Nov

well today it would have been a good idea
(runs for cover)

 

Tours don't normally have assistance up the bank. Take for example the Dorset Coast Express, where the banker normally detaches @ Wareham, and have a look at this example where Tangers had a load of 11 & made it up the bank (granted only just). I was surprised though when it was confirmed that this tour would only use one of IR's 5's when both came down - they're always together.

 

Some certainly need them, others certainly don't, and there are many that one could debate long into the night (as we often do). Define "such as this" without using hind-sight - there's the rub!

 

I am at a loss to understand how apparently no proper cost / risk assessment is made for each tour. Surely a proper one would have raised this as an unacceptable risk?

 

Parkstone bank is about 1 in 60. A Black 5 on load 11 might just possibly have made it, but the killer at this time of year is the railhead condition. Running on such a busy route at this time of year with just a single engine without assistance is asking for trouble. It is an almost exact repeat of the Tangmere debacle on 17 November last year, but lessons don't seem to have been learnt sadly.

PS Its not just steam that sometimes comes to grief on Parkstone bank. I have twice travelled on a diesel hauled train which slipped to a halt here, on both occasions behind a Class 33, and both in November.

David

 

I have vivid memories of stalling on the curvy 1-in-36 bank from Exeter St David's to Exeter Central with "Pocket Rocket" and Tangmere double heading a load which most people considered too heavy as early as leaving Minehead with unfortunate consequences i.e. delay to services and the need to roll back down the bank to St David's. That was a West Coast roster with Peter Kirke on the leading locomotive.

If I was on the train at Poole today waiting to climb Parkstone bank with 11 on from a dead start in late November, I would have had the same feelings as I had with the Exeter incident. "No Way Jose". Black 5's were brilliant their heyday and I have notes of travelling from Chester to Crewe in the summer of 1964 with 15 on and reaching 72mph. This is a different kettle of fish and even back in 1964 under the same circumstances, the result would have been the same.............an unrecoverable stall. Wasn't there also Upper Scudamore to consider on the way back? That again, would have been asking for trouble.

Pity no one thought of having 2 Black 5's on the tour in which case, this would not have happened.

 

I'd say load 10 with a class 5 on a 1 in 60 in November with all the wet leaves etc was "brave" to be polite, I'm not sure it's hindsight to suggest 45407 should have gone with it.

 

I think they surely must have done but for countless reasons only one was sent down to Poole. Why isn't really any of our business.

It really is no wonder that tour operators get so peed of with this forum, the majority on here have no idea of the complexity of running a steam charter. I was one of them in the past but a little while ago had it all explained to me and now it will take a lot for me to criticise them.

Comments like "why didn't they just put another black 5 on" just show how clueless some people are. Considering Tangmere's failure on Tuesday "the industry" has done a good job getting steam on today and such short notice. Had a single Black 5 been rostered months ago then people could have been more critical of motive power.

Note 83B this isn't a personal attack on you mate it would be good if someone like Ben Mason or Nigel Dobbing could write a detailed post about steam charter planning but alas they are probably too busy planning steam charters!

 

There is a thing called risk assessment and the assessment is whether a Black 5 with 11 on will climb the hills out and back without stalling.

Professional and amateur opinions on this forum all lead to the same conclusion that the load was too heavy. It therefore beggars belief that West Coast did not reach the same conclusion. Had they done so, the diesel would have stayed on the back or a second Black 5 assuming it was available, should have been provided.

Maybe some of us are not as clueless as you, by the sounds of it.

 

Yes, but in defence of West Coast, 44932 scaled the bank in November 2010 with a similar load and no box on the back. (I was on it) two slight slips, both caught, but we made it to Branksome with no problems.

 

So much for trying to be polite eh? Another reason why so many people don't bother with this site.

I hadn't mentioned the diesel but yes it should certainly have stayed attached. And then as 44871 flew through Parkstone with a Class 33 roaring fit to burst on the back (actually wouldn't it have had to be on the front now?) everyone could have had a whale of a time bashing West Coast and RYTC. I do feel for those guys, they simply cannot win!

Yes absolutely in this case we can see the diesel should have been there. Makes you wonder how many other times a "box" has prevented such a similar situation on steam tours in the past despite much raised blood pressure on the forum? Maybe people will be a bit more welcoming of the diesel fleet that keeps steam on the main line in future? (Now that is some clueless thinking.......!)

 

Some people here have had a lifetime of observing and recording steam locomotives at work.

In no way does that make us anything like experts in train planning in it's widest sense or in the actual handling of a steam locomotive on the footplate.

But it does tell us, from all those years of experience behind steam, (over 50 years in my case), what can usually be achieved fairly reliably and what has a much higher risk of non achievement.

And a Black 5, (and I think a number of other classes), starting virtually cold on a quite heavy train, in November with a grade of up to 1/60 steep just about one mile away is most certainly a situation with a high risk of non-achievement.

I also feel, in this case, that a lifetime of experience behind steam locomotives was perhaps not needed to come to the same conclusion.

 

Actually the railhead conditions were not that bad.....not alot of contamination if any at all....

 

Your politeness is acknowledged Campainr and I did not mean to be rude. I guess when incidents like this happen, it gets the emotional roller coaster that is mainline steam, well and truly going.

 

Far from clueless, but tha fact remains, a class 5 on load 11 on 1 in 60 in November should have been flagged up as too much of a risk, course adding 45407 adds a cost and more man hours, but any saving in using only 44871 has probably been lost in delay minutes now.

 

Just to posit a further thought - given that 34067 was the booked loco for this train until Saturday night's misfortune.

If the original risk assessment held that 34067 was capable of working without diesel support then WCRC as TOC would have arranged the appropriate staffing levels for steam traction only. With the failure of 34067 it may have been that (a) Black 5s were the only immediately available traction (b) WCRC could not find available staff to crew an assisting locomotive and (c) made a further risk assessment that if 44932 succeeded on a similar load at a similar time of year there was reasonable ( my italics) prospects of 44871 succeeding this year.

It has already been noted that the driver of 44871 made his way to the nearest station to get a taxi to where the 33 was stabled and returned to offer assistance and full credit to him and WCRC for so doing. The problem in today's railway, where costs are pared to the bone and resources are becoming increasingly hard to source, is that any incident has the ability to escalate from minor problem to major incident in less time than it takes to say "Houston - we have a problem" and the increasingly frequent services being operated only adds to the consequences.

Rather than take a look at what went wrong - and WHY - surely it is best to leave that to the experts and concentrate on praising the efforts on those who sought to reduce the consequences of a poor (in hindsight) decision. After all, who among the many critics have never made a poor decision with unexpected or serious consequences ?

 

Is a 50% success rate of getting up a bank in these circumstances acceptable though ?, should be nearer three figures.

 

Well thankyou! And yes indeed it does.