WCRC Licence Suspended

One of the things the RAIB will be looking at is possible reasons why the preceding caution aspects were missed. This will include visibility and sight line issues, and distractions in the cab. (one of the distractions is likely to be the spurious (for Tangmere anyway) TSR warning. Its all very well to say they missed the signals, you have to remember that in the days of steam, with the exhaust and poor visibility therein signals were regularly missed and a reoccurring cause of accidents. The lewisham train crash is a classic example. Its probably fair to say that a lot of signals are now no longer optimally positioned for steam traction visibility

 

Probably because "train company that operates the Hogwarts Express is banned" is much better copy for a non-specialist publication than "train company is banned"...

Tom

 

I suspect it is our "integrated railway" backgrounds that may add to the confusion here, Tom!

The Safety Management System relates to the "operational" side of the business - the actual running of the trains. The Engineering processes are a separate issue, which are clearly linked when any TOC is operating its own stock.

However, if you look at the Vintage Trains situation - where Bob, Ben and co at Tyseley do the maintenance and provide the stock and WCRC operate the train, or DBS operations, where usually Riviera (or, of course, VSOE) provide stock and various groups locomotives but DBS operate, the distinction between operator and engineer/stock provider is much clearer. As Fred has pointed out, WCRC combine these various parts within one organisation but the roles, responsibilities and systems remain as separate as in those other cases I have listed as examples.

Steven

 

The 'Hogwarts Express' link was bound to be picked up on by the media as it's on WCRC's homepage. Any journalist looking to draw the wider public in to the story will want to provide something that people will have heard about/ are familiar with, so it's inevitable that 'Hogwarts Express', 'Settle and Carlisle' and 'Jacobite' will be referred to in various reporting.

Jon

 

Woo hold on there. Any safety management system has to be integrated, even when the resources are not supplied or owned by the operator. As the TOC WCRC is wholly responsible for resources and operations when it enters Network Rail. Therefore the WCRC safety management process should have the required sockets for resources (locos and stock -which by definition includes the maintenance of same) provided by other parties. Try and separate responsibility will have the wrath of NR safety managers on your head. One of the reasons WCRC is in this mess is because they tried to ring fence and justify their closed Safety Management system,

 

I am well aware of the Lewisham crash, my father was on the Hayes train and was seriously injured. Same class of engine. Lewisham no 34066, Wooton Basset 34067.

 

Yes isn't it funny how similarities can crop up unexpectedly many years apart. Well actually its not that surprising wherever human beings are involved.

 

The FGW train was 4 down. If it had been 6 down then a collision would have occurred that's why it matters

 

There will clearly have to be interfaces but the Safety Management System for an operator, like the previous regime of Safety Cases, only covering ensuring that vehicles in use are fit for traffic, and how the engineering processes of the maintainers are verified as ensuring this is the case. Remember, within the wider industry, there are "wet" and "dry" leases, so some stock is maintained by the operator, but a lot, especially newer, stock isn't and is maintained by the manufacturer, or a contractor to the Operator. The system has to apply to both scenarios and even where the operator also maintains, the SMS won't include the full engineering processes the maintenance operation requires.

This is a specific structural issue with the way the Rail industry was set up after Privatisation. The Operator's SMS must show how it satisfies itself stock and traction are fit for purpose, but does not include the detailed engineering processes which back up this condition, merely the system of satisfying the operator it is the case. That may seem like an unncessary division but actually it is essential when the same overall structure applies to cases where operator and stock maintainer are both parts of the same organisation and situations where they are not.

Today, the Cleethorpes train is in the later category. The Track Access Contract (which is what Network Rail have suspended) and the links between than and an adequate SMS do not cover the detail of how stock is maintained, merely how the fact is is fit to run is established - IN THIS INDUSTRY. Others may differ.

Steven

 

Edit: In light of Big Al's comment below, let me stress that I have no wish to reopen the old debate about the rights and wrongs of WCRC's refusal to operate Tornado. I wish only to point out that WCRC's declared reason was concerned with procedures having been followed, or not, and that now they themselves have got into serious trouble (for at least the second time) over procedures. This does gives every appearance of "the biter bit".

 

I filmed Tangmere at Chippenham on the 7th March about 10 minutes before the SPAD incident and the smoke/steam and a very low sun cannot have made it easy to see the road ahead:

 

G'day all from 'the land down under', I might just weigh into this conversation
I see relevance with 'if' statements... IF the driver / fireman hadn't been 'naughty' and tampered with the system which links the TPWS/AWS system with break demands the train wouldn't have SPADDED and IF WCRC didn't have compliance issues WCRC / mainline tour organisations / their customers and rail enthusiasts wouldn't be in the situation they currently are in...

 

Very scary when you think about it like that.

 

Small point and excuse my ignorance but if the HST was 6 down but with the road set for it still (and thus against Tangmere), is there not any safety mechanism that would have prevented Tangmere getting to the junction in the first place - are things such as catch points not used in such situations?

 

I think the FTR processes may be relevant as part of NR's stance. IIRC the problems identified with 5972 last year included the fact that the FTR was undertaken by the same person who had maintained it albeit in different roles but qualified in those roles to undertake the necessary work. So whilst the FTR was undertaken by 2 different roles, the fact was that the same person held both roles and - AIUI - NR expressed their concern at the time.

I still believe that the main WCRC problem is documentation and the presence of paper trails with sufficient information to follow up any incidents such as the recent SPAD. Whilst the physical elements are in place on the locomotives my understanding of the various letters suggest that the paper work (i.e. procedure notes and operating instructions) may not be to the standard expected by NR hence the potential for errors of omission and commission that resulted in Wootton Bassett. Having been involved in major computer documentation I can vouch for how specific procedures and instructions need to be - and how easy it is to miss something that later becomes highly important.

However - again - I would exercise caution as my interpretation may not accord with the findings of the RAIB - and it is on those findings that future action(s) will depend. Whilst action against WCRC has been been both taken and widely publicised I would hope that comments can be restrained and not seek to vilify the crew who are at the centre of the current investigations.